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Abstract 
Although developing economies are more volatile, firms in developed countries hold more cash and less debt.  We 
show that despite greater aggregate and industry stability, the performance and balance sheets of individual firms in 
developed countries are more volatile.  In developing countries, market imperfections insulate incumbent firms from 
competitive risk.  Cross-country differences in firm rivalry and cash flow risk are greater in technology-intensive, 
external-finance-dependent, and large-firm-dominated industries where we expect greater market imperfections.  
Firms in developed countries are more sensitive to shocks.  Most of the adjustments come from cash balance.  We 
propose product market competition as a new channel in which market imperfections can drive the international 
difference in financial policies. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial policies of firms in developed and developing countries differ greatly.  Although some dissimilarities 
can be explained by cross-country differences in legal and political institutions, trade patterns, and access to 
financial markets, others remain puzzling.  Thus, although in the aggregate and industry levels developing 
economies are more volatile, firms in developed countries appear to have more conservative liquidity and capital 
structure policies (more cash, lower leverage, and fewer short-term liabilities).  For instance, average cash holding 
scaled by total assets is 25% in Australia and 21% in the U.S. while an average Indian and Russian firm only holds 
6.8% and 8.8% in cash, respectively.
1
   
The higher cash holdings in developed countries are, at first sight, perplexing, in view of the widespread perception 
that that developing economies are risker than are those in developed economies.  Starting with the 1988 work of 
Robert E. Lucas, numerous authors have shown that developed countries tend to exhibit stable output growth over 
extended periods of time, while developing countries are more prone to sharp fluctuations and frequent financial 
crises.
2
   
At the industry level, prior studies have shown that poor institutions make financially dependent industries in 
developing countries more volatile and more vulnerable to recessions.  As a result, it would be natural to assume that 
firms in developing countries are riskier and that they adopt more conservative financial policies to address the 
higher risk.  In this paper, we show that this intuitive conjecture is not true.  We find that at the firm level, good 
institutions make incumbent firms more volatile, especially in financially dependent industries.
3
  
We first show that firms in developed countries have higher risk.  Firm-level growth rates in assets, cash, debts, 
short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment are more volatile in developed countries.  The cross-sectional 
dispersions of these variables are also higher in developed countries.  However, we find completely opposite firm-
level results at the aggregate levels.  After being averaged across firms, we find that the sector- and country-level 
growth rates are less volatile in developed countries. 
                                                          
1
 See Table 1 for details. 
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 See, for example, Lucas (1988), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003); Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and 
Kose (2006); Aguiar and Gopinath (2007); and Koren and Tenreyro (2007). 
3
 We further argue that our finding (that firm-level risk is greater in developed countries) does not contradict the 
aggregate results in prior literature that industries and economies in the developed world are less volatile (e.g., 
Raddatz (2006) and Braun and Larrain (2005)).  We present a model in which a well-functioning financial system 
that promptly reallocates capital to the most productive use can pose risk to individual companies but achieve 
aggregate stability at the same time.  We indeed document an inverse relation between aggregate volatilities and 
firm-level volatilities in our WorldScope sample. 
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We propose that firm-level volatilities in developing countries are lower due to imperfections in capital and product 
markets.  We show that the cross-country difference in operating risk is more pronounced in those industries where 
we expect a higher degree of market imperfections.  The difference in firm-level volatilities is greater in technology-
intensive, external-finance-dependent, and large-firm-dominated industries.  We also show that in one important 
source of risk, intensity of competition, the differences between developing and developed countries are also greater 
in those industries.  These findings are consistent with the notion that market imperfections act to insulate incumbent 
firms from risk.   
We link financial policies to risk by examining how firms react to exogenous shocks.  Using productivity data from 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) database, we find that firm-level growth rates in 
assets, cash, debts, short-term liabilities, sales, and profit are more responsive to shocks in developed countries.  
Among all types of assets and liabilities, most of the adjustments come from cash balance.  Our results suggest that 
firms devise financial policies to accommodate their firm-level risk.  
There are many studies on the cross-country determinants of a firm’s capital structure.  Rajan and Zingales (1995); 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1998); Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001); and 
Giannetti (2003) examine the way in which institutional environment affects capital structure in different countries.  
Although the current literature focuses on the direct effects of market imperfections such as agency costs, taxes, and 
limited access to financial markets, this paper shows that market imperfections can also affect financial policies 
indirectly through product market competition.  Financial policies may differ across countries because the nature of 
product markets is different.  It might be rational for firms in developing countries to hold less cash and have higher 
leverage because they have lower competitive risk. 
Recent papers on international capital structure focus on specific components of firm liabilities, such as line of credit 
(Lins, Servaes, and Tufano, 2010), trade credit (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2012), short- and long-term debts 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Fan, Titman, and Twite, 2012), and foreign debt (Allayannis, Brown, and 
Klapper, 2003).  Other related papers study international patterns of security issuances (Miller and Reisel, 2012; 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2013; Gullapalli, 2013) and equity ownership (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Lins, 2003; 
Laeven and Levine, 2007).  We contribute to this literature by showing that the cross-country difference in product 
market risk is an important factor that must be taken into consideration. 
Most prior international papers on cash and leverage use panel or cross-sectional regressions.  In effect, these papers 
study the equilibrium financial structures.  In this paper, we also examine firm’s reaction to productivity shocks.  
Examining the way in which firms adjust their cash and other financial structures in response to exogenous shocks 
directly tests our risk-based explanation.
4
  Moreover, while existing papers tend to study capital structure or cash in 
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 Existing papers analyze the dynamic patterns of investment in fixed assets across countries.  McLean, Zhang, and 
Zhao (2012) examine the investment’s sensitivity to Tobin’s Q and cash flows at the firm-level.  Love (2003) 
estimates an investment Euler equation linking capital expenditure to lagged investment, sales, and financial 
3 
 
isolation, we analyze leverage and all other major components of firm assets and liabilities at the same time.  Given 
that operating risk is likely to affect many components of financial structures simultaneously, it is appropriate to 
investigate several financial policies at the same time. 
Studies of cash holdings across countries show that firms in rich countries hold more cash, but firms in poor 
countries hold more fixed assets.  Caprio, Faccio, and McConnell (2012) suggest that cash can easily be 
expropriated by politicians and bureaucrats.  Therefore, firms in poor countries where the threat of political 
extraction is high have an incentive to hold less cash to shelter their assets from extractions.  Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2003) suggest that the Keynesian transaction demand for money drives this result.  They explain that 
cash holding can reduce transaction costs.  Hence, firms in countries with higher cost of labor hold more cash.
5
    
Lins and Kalcheva (2007), and also Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006), study the value implications of cash 
holdings.  These studies both suggest that corporate cash holdings are less valuable in countries with weak 
shareholders protection.  In Section 8, we discuss how our explanation complements these studies and verify that the 
operating risk mechanism we proposed is not confounded with existing explanations.
6
 
Our paper is also related to recent research on volatilities of stock returns.  Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show that 
idiosyncratic return volatilities are higher in developed countries.  Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2011) suggest that 
institutional variables such as investor protection and stock market development can explain cross-country 
differences in return volatilities.  McLean, Pontiff, and Zhao (2011) show that equity market liberalization is 
associated with changes in stock return and fundamental volatilities.  Since return volatilities are computed from 
stock prices, they are driven both by real factors such as cash flow risk, and financial factors such as noise trading.  
In this paper, we focus on real factors by studying volatilities of the growth in real variables: assets, cash, debts, 
short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  More importantly, we take a step further to identify the sources 
of risk.  We hypothesize that international differences in firm-level risk come from capital and product market 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
constraints.  Wurgler (2000) uses the UNIDO Database to study how industry-level capital formation responds to 
productivity shocks, as measured by value added.  In this paper, we study how firm-level asset and liability 
structures respond to exogenous productivity shocks from UNIDO. 
5
 According to Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003), “With the transaction motive, firms hold cash to 
economize on the costs of transacting.  The transaction motive is a ‘shoe leather’ theory of money demand: it is 
cheaper to hold cash than to send somebody to the bank.  As a result, cash holdings increase with the cost of labor” 
(p.3). 
6
 There is a large literature on the cash holding of firms in the United States.  See, for example, Faulkender and 
Wang (2006); Fresard (2010); Gamba and Triantis (2008); Gao, Harford, and Li (2013); and Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008).  Our paper shows that precautionary demand for cash differs across countries due to the varying 
degrees of market imperfections.  
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imperfections.  We show that the volatilities are more different in industries in which we expect a higher degree of 
market imperfections (technology-intensive, external-finance-dependent, and large-firm-dominated industries).   
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we outline the conceptual framework.  In Section 3 we present our 
data sources and sample construction.  In Section 4 we examine the cross-country determinants of asset and liability 
structures, and in Section 5 the cross-country determinants of firm-level risk.  In Section 6 we analyze firm-level 
risk in different industries, and in Section 7 firms’ response to productivity shocks.  Section 8 presents additional 
tests, and Section 9 concludes.  We report most robustness checks in Internet Appendix A and propose a stylized 
model of real volatilities in Internet Appendix B.    
2.  Framework 
Empirical Framework and Key Findings 
The paper is structured  (1) to document an important puzzle about financial policies of firms in different countries, 
(2) to propose firm-level risk as a potential explanation, (3) to identify what drive the cross-country difference in 
firm-level risk, and (4) to examine how financial structures react to exogenous productivity shocks.  More precisely, 
we answer four related questions below: 
1. Are asset and liability structures different across countries?    
To answer this question we first compare financial structures of firms in developed and developing countries.  We 
study the cross-country difference in cash holdings, intangible assets, total liabilities, and short-term liabilities.  We 
scale these variables by total assets and regress them on country dummies or other institutional factors such as Per 
Capita GDP and financial development indicators, controlling for size quintile, industry, and year fixed-effects.   
We find that firms in developed countries, in high-tech industries and for firms that are smaller, hold more cash 
while firms in manufacturing industries hold less cash.  Firms in rich countries also have lower leverage, use fewer 
short-term liabilities, and have higher current ratios.  We find that firms in rich countries have more conservative 
financial structures.
7
  
2. Is firm-level risk different across countries?       
                                                          
7
 To address the concern that observations in developed and developing countries are not comparable because firms 
in different countries decide to go public at different stages in their life cycles, we also control for age and relative 
size.  Our results still hold.  In Section 6, we also study market shares among industry leaders (the largest two firms 
in each industry).  In this subsample of well-established companies, we still find that market shares are less volatile 
in developing countries.  Restricting our sample to industry leaders provides an alternative method for ensuring that 
our findings on risk are not driven by the inclusion of small firms in developed countries.  In Section 8, we further 
control for a number of firm characteristics such as leverage, R&D, and Tobin’s Q in the cash-holding regressions.  
We do not include these variables in the main regressions since they are potentially endogenous.    
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We examine whether performance and characteristics of individual firms are more volatile in certain countries.  We 
compute the volatilities of firm-level growth rates in assets, cash holdings, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-
term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  To be consistent with our examination of asset and liability 
structures, we use reduced-form models, regressing our volatility measures on country dummies, and controlling for 
firm size and industry effects.   
We find that firms in developed countries are more volatile.  These volatilities are also higher in high-tech industries 
and among small firms, and lower in manufacturing industries. We also find that cross-sectional dispersions of 
performance and characteristics of individual firms are higher in developed countries.   
For comparison purposes, we examine aggregate risk in different countries.  We average the firm-level growth rates 
within each sector (based on 17 Fama-French industries) and within each country.  We then compute the sector- and 
country-level volatilities.  Opposite to the firm-level results, we find that the sector- and country-level volatilities are 
higher in developing countries.  These findings are consistent with the widely-accepted view that developing 
economies are less stable.   
3. What drives the difference in firm-level risk?      
We examine whether the cross-country difference in firm-level risk is more pronounced in certain industries.  We 
hypothesize that idiosyncratic risk is likely to be influenced by imperfections in product and capital markets, 
because these imperfections can insulate incumbent firms from risk.  Detailed arguments are in the discussion 
below.   
Following the difference-in-difference method in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we regress firm-level volatilities on 
country dummy, industry characteristics, and the interactions between the two, again controlling for firm size.  We 
find that cross-country differences in firm-level volatilities are more pronounced in technology-intensive, financial-
dependent, and large-firm-dominated industries.  These are the industries where we expect the higher degree of 
market imperfections.    
4. How do a firm’s assets and liabilities change in response to exogenous productivity shocks?  
We link cross-country differences in financial structure to the underlying firm-level risk by examining how firms 
react to real shocks.  To avoid reverse causality, we measure productivity shocks as the growth rate of domestic 
value added, which we obtain from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database as opposed to Tobin’s Q or cash flow 
shocks at the firm level.  (Shocks to cash flows and Q can be driven by change in firm’s financial policies.)  We 
regress growth rates in assets, cash holdings, current assets, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, 
sales, profit, and employment on these productivity shocks.   
We find that firms in developed countries are more responsive to exogenous real shocks.  Across all types of assets 
and liabilities, most of the adjustments come from cash balance.  Our results suggest that firms devise financial 
policies to accommodate their firm-level risk. 
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We use a stylized model of real volatilities to illustrate how market imperfections in developing countries can lead 
to lower risk at the firm level but higher risk at the aggregate level.  The details are presented in Internet Appendix 
B.  In our model, the economy has two firms competing for limited supply of production resources.  Firms receive 
random productivity shocks in each period.  Initial endowment of production resources can be reallocated across 
firms in response to the productivity shocks.  With a linear production function, the first best allocation from our 
model is to transfer all the resources from the losing (low-productivity) firm to the winning (high-productivity) firm.    
The central assumption here is that goods and capital markets might be less than fully efficient.  Specifically, we 
assume that it is costly to reallocate resources across firms.  Examples of such costs include external financing cost 
of the expanding firms or the cost associated with asymmetric information in the market for corporate assets.  These 
costs prevent the winning firm from expanding and the losing firm from contracting.  We expect that these costs are 
larger in developing countries.
8
 
Proposition 1 in Internet Appendix B states that output growth of firms in developed countries is more volatile.  
Firm-level volatility is decreasing in the degree of market imperfections.  Proposition 2 states that output growth of 
firms in developed countries is more sensitive to productivity shocks.  Output-to-shock sensitivity is decreasing in 
the degree of market imperfections.  To prove these propositions, we first show that the amount of resources being 
reallocated from the losing firm to the winning firm is decreasing with the reallocation costs.  Then, we prove that 
firm-level volatility (time-series standard deviation of output growth over a sample path) is increasing in the amount 
of resources being reallocated in each period.  For Proposition 2, we define output-to-shock sensitivity as the beta 
coefficient from a regression whose dependent variable is output growth and explanatory variable is productivity 
shock, estimated over a sample path.  We prove that this sensitivity estimate is increasing in the amount of resources 
being reallocated in each period.  Thus, we expect that firms in countries with larger costs of reallocation across 
firms are subject to lower firm-level risk.  Firms in developing countries where financial market imperfections do 
slow the reallocation of resources are subject to smaller volatility and are less sensitive to productivity shocks. 
Our model predicts the inversion of firm-level and aggregate volatilities.  Proposition 3 states that aggregate output 
growth is less volatile in developed countries.  Aggregate volatility is increasing in the degree of market 
imperfections.  The intuition of our proof is as follows.  We decompose aggregate output into two components: 
output generated by the initial endowment (as if reallocation is not feasible) and gain from reallocation.  The 
volatility in aggregate output comes from fluctuation in the first component.  Without reallocation, aggregate output 
is high when the initial endowment is “right” (the firm with larger initial endowment receives higher productivity 
shock) and aggregate output is low when the initial endowment is “wrong” (the firm with the smaller initial 
endowment receive the higher productivity shock).  The gain from reallocation is state invariant and increasing with 
the amount of resources being reallocated across firms.  As the reallocation costs decrease, the amount of resources 
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 In the extreme case where the costs associated with market imperfections are infinitely large, firms always produce 
with their initial endowment.  In a case where these costs are positive but not infinitely large, firms partially respond 
to productivity shocks. 
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being reallocated and gain from reallocation increase.  As the gain from the reallocation component grows, output 
generated by initial endowment as a fraction of aggregate output shrinks.  Therefore, the aggregate volatility (which 
is driven by fluctuation in output generated by initial endowment) is increasing with the reallocation costs.   In other 
words, we expect that developing economies where financial market imperfections impede resource reallocation are 
subject to higher aggregate volatility.   
3. Data and Sample Construction  
Here, we describe the data and present sample statistics at the country, industry, and individual firm levels.  The 
sample statistics show that asset and financial structures characteristics differ between firms in developed and 
developing countries.  
3.1 Firm-Level Data 
Our main source for firm-level data is WorldScope, which covers over 95% of the world market capitalization and 
provides financial statement information on firms around the world.  WorldScope is the standard data source of 
many recent studies on financial policies and investment (see Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) and McLean, Zhang, 
and Zhao (2012)).  We construct a 1988-2008 annual data set of all the public firms available in 46 countries (25 
developed and 21 developing countries).  Among the 46 countries, WorldScope provides full coverage of the listed 
firms in 31 countries, ten of which are developing countries.  WorldScope also provides targeted coverage (all listed 
firms with the market capitalization higher than 100 million dollars) for 15 countries.  Internet Appendix C lists 
these countries and their coverage. 
A potential concern with WorldScope is that publicly listed firms in developed and developing countries might be 
inherently different.  For example, listed firms in developing countries might be larger and more mature than listed 
firms in developed countries where firms early in their life-cycle can raise funds in equity markets.  We perform a 
number of robustness checks to address this selection issue.  Besides the size quintile, we control for the exact firm 
size (both total assets and market capitalization), the size relative to other firms in its country, the size relative to 
other firms in its sector, and firm age.  We also use a full set of two-digit SIC industry fixed-effects.  Internet 
Appendix A summarizes the robustness results.  In Section 8, we further control for other firm characteristics: 
leverage, dividend, capital expenditure, acquisitions, R&D, and Tobin’s Q.  We confirm that our cross-country 
results are not driven by selection of firms along these observable dimensions.  
We measure all variables in U.S. dollars.  Following other studies, we exclude all financial firms and regulated 
utilities (primary SIC 4900 - 4999, 6000 - 6999, and above 9000).  We also exclude all observations with zero or 
negative total assets.  To ensure that our results are not driven by the difference in size distribution across countries, 
we create a control for size by constructing the size quintile variable based on the global distribution of the total 
assets of all firms in WorldScope. 
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We use six measures to study firm assets and liabilities structures: firm size (natural log of total assets), cash/total 
assets, intangible assets/total assets, total liabilities/total assets, short-term liabilities/total liabilities, and short-term 
liabilities/short-term assets.  To reduce the possibility that our results may be driven by outliers or any mistakes in 
the original data set, we winsorize all the variables at 1%.  In Table 1, Panel A reports the number of firm-year 
observations and average assets and liabilities structures country by country.  Panel B compares asset and liability 
structures in developed and developing countries. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
From the size column in Table 1 Panel A, we see that firms in developed countries are slightly larger than are firms 
in developing countries.  From Table 1, Panel B, firm size (the average natural log of total assets in US$) is 4.77 in 
developed countries and 4.75 in developing countries.  Since WorldScope constructs its sample based on market 
capitalization, the size distribution of firms is not very different across countries.  This finding means that the 
difference between developed and developing countries in our latter analysis is not likely to be driven by firm size.        
Cash holdings vary greatly across countries.  It is apparent that firms in rich countries hold more cash than do firms 
in poorer countries.  For example, in Table 1, Panel A shows the countries with the lowest cash-to-total-assets ratios 
are Colombia (6.88%), India (6.8%), and Peru (6.17%).  The countries with the highest cash-to-total-assets ratios are 
Australia (25.07%), Israel (25.51%), and the United States (21.18%).  In Table 1, Panel B shows that firms in 
developed countries have an average cash-to-assets ratio of 18% and that firms in developing countries have the 
average cash-to-assets ratio of 11.94%.  The 6.77% difference yields t-statistics of 82.79.  These statistics are in line 
with the descriptive statistics in Caprio, Faccio, and McConnell (2012). 
Intangible assets are also very different across countries.  We find that firms in developed countries have more 
intangible assets relative to total assets.  For example, in Table 1, Panel A shows that the countries with the lowest 
intangible-to-total-assets ratios are Brazil (1.83%), Indonesia (1.57%), and Venezuela (1.34%).  The countries with 
the highest intangible-to-total-assets ratios are Ireland (14.19%), Sweden (15.79%), and the United States (15.24%).  
In Table 1, Panel B shows that firms in developed countries have an average intangible-to-total-assets ratio of 
9.73%; firms in developing countries have average ratios of 3.38%.  The 6.35% difference yields t-statistics of 
98.74.   
Leverage is relatively similar across countries, but maturity structures are very different.  Leverage is slightly lower 
in developed countries.  In Table 1, Panel B shows that the average total-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio is 26.08 in 
developed countries and 28.44 in developing countries.  Firms in developing countries have much higher short-term 
liabilities relative to their total liabilities.  For example, in Table 1, Panel A, we see that the countries with the 
highest short-term-to-total-liabilities ratios are China (80.13%), Malaysia (65.13%), and Turkey (68.22%).  The 
countries with the lowest short-term-to-total-liabilities ratios are Finland (34.18%), Norway (27.99%), and Sweden 
(35.3%).  The average short-term-liabilities ratio in the United States is 37.51%.  In Table 1, Panel B shows that 
firms in developed countries have an average short-term-to-total-liabilities ratio of 46.42%, but firms in developing 
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countries have an average ratio of 61.27%.  The -14.85% difference yield t-statistics of -100.86.  These findings are 
consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012). 
Our descriptive statistics and univariate analysis in Table 1 show that firms in developed and developing countries 
have drastically different asset and liability structures.  Firms in developed countries seem to have more 
conservative financial policies (more cash, slightly lower leverage, and fewer short-term liabilities).  Firms in 
developed countries also have more intangible assets relative to their total assets.  Thus, the sample characteristics of 
our firms are in accord with earlier studies. 
Next, we compute the growth rate of each firm financial structure (total assets, cash, intangible assets, total debts, 
and short-term liabilities) and the outcome variable (sales, profit, and employment).  Growth rate is defined as the 
difference in natural log.  We winsorize all of the original variables at 1% before computing the growth rates.  Then 
we compute volatilities (time-series standard deviations) of the growth rates and use them as a measure of risk.  In 
Table 2, Panel A reports the number of firms and firm-level risk country by country.  Panel B reports the average 
firm-level risk in developed and developing countries.  For comparison purposes, Panel C reports the average 
growth rates in developed and developing countries.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
In Table 2, Panel A shows that firms in developed countries are more volatile than are firms in developing countries.  
The difference in volatilities is present in all of the variables except intangible assets.  For example, the countries 
with the most volatile sales growth are Australia (0.76), Canada (0.6), and Norway (0.55).  The least volatile 
countries are mostly emerging markets.  Developing countries with the least volatile sales growth are Colombia 
(0.23), Egypt (0.21), and Lithuania (0.17).  We observe similar patterns for total assets, cash, profit, total liabilities, 
current liabilities, and employment. 
In Table 2, Panel B shows that the univariate comparison confirms that firms in developed countries have higher 
firm-level risk.  The average volatility of sales growth is 0.432 in developed countries and 0.388 in developing 
countries.  The volatility of total assets is 0.436 in developed and 0.347 in developing countries.  Cash-holding 
volatility is 1.113 in developed countries and 1.092 in developing countries.  Profit volatility is 0.639 in developed 
countries and 0.593 in developing countries.  Total liabilities volatility is 0.873 in developed countries and 0.718 in 
developing countries.  Short-term liabilities volatility is 1.162 in developed countries and 0.97 in developing 
countries.  Employment volatility is 0.317 in developed countries and 0.257 in developing countries.  The 
differences between developed and developing countries are statistically significant at the 1% level for total assets, 
intangible assets, total debts, and short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  The difference in volatilities 
of cash holding is statistically significant at 10%.  
It is possible that firms with high average growth rates will automatically have high volatilities and that our 
volatilities difference is the by-product of growth rates difference.  We report the average firm growth rates in 
developed and developing countries in Panel C of Table 2.  It turns out that despite lower volatilities, firms in 
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developing countries have higher or similar average growth rates.  In other words, if we measure firm-level risk as 
volatilities of firm growth scaled by average firm growth, the difference between developed and developing 
countries will be even larger than those presented here.         
When we compare volatilities of different variables, we find that  in the global average column in Table 2, Panel B, 
cash and short-term liabilities are more volatile  compared to other components of firm financial structures.  
Intangible assets and total liabilities are less volatile.  We estimate the average volatilities of cash holding and short-
term liabilities growth at 1.107. The average volatility of intangible assets growth is 0.83 and that of total liabilities 
growth is 0.802.  Among the outcome variables, profit growth is the most volatile; sales growth is the second, and 
employment growth is the least volatile.  We estimate their average volatilities at 0.624, 0.419, and 0.304, 
respectively.                            
Our descriptive statistics and univariate analyses suggest that firms in developed and developing countries have 
different levels of real risks.  Volatilities of sales, assets, cash holding, profit, total debts, current liabilities, and 
employment growth rates are higher in developed countries.  
4.2 Industry-Level Data 
To control for industry characteristics, we include two-digit SIC dummies in our regressions.  When we analyze how 
industry characteristics affect our results, we replace the industry dummies with various industry indicators.  The 
manufacturing dummy is equal to one if the firm is in SIC codes 2000-3999, which Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) 
define as tradable industries.  The high-tech dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry according 
to the American Electronic Association.  The external finance dependent indicator is from Rajan and Zingales 
(1998).  The small-firm-dominated industry indicator is from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008).  
We construct a measure of foreign entry using mergers and acquisitions data from Thomson's Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database.  Our sample covers all deals announced and completed between 1989 and 1998.  To 
avoid reverse causality when we study the impacts of foreign entry on firm volatilities, we compute the measure of 
foreign entry from 1989-1998 data and compute the firm-level volatilities from the non-overlapping period of 1999-
2008 (as opposed to the full 1989-2008 sample in other specifications).  For each sector (one of the 17 Fama-French 
industries) in each country, we construct foreign entry by aggregating all inward cross-border M&As and scaling 
them by all (domestic and inward foreign) M&As during 1989-1998.  We also compute the aggregate volume of all 
outward cross-border M&As scaled by the volume of all (domestic and outward foreign) M&As for a robustness 
check.  
We use the UNIDO General Industrial Statistics database, INDSTAT-4 2011, to construct productivity shocks.  This 
database reports gross fixed capital formation, value added, output, establishments, employment, fixed capital, and 
sales data for up to four-digit ISIC manufacturing industries.  There are 127 ISIC industries in the data set.  
Following Wurgler (2000), we define productivity shock as the percentage change in value added.  We also use 
percentage growth in domestic output and percentage growth in labor productivity (output per worker) as alternative 
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measures for productivity shocks.  In each country and year, the shocks are constructed at the four-digit ISIC level.  
We match each firm in WorldScope to the ISIC industry (or industries) based on its primary SIC code. 
3.3 Country-Level Data 
We base our developed-country indicator on the World Bank’s Atlas method classification.  The developed-country 
dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is 
classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  The list of all developed and developing countries is available in 
Internet Appendix C.
9
  
Our alternative measure of country characteristic is 1980 per capital GDP from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicator (WDI) database.  (All of our main results hold for contemporaneous GDP as well.)  We 
choose the year 1980 to avoid reverse causality because our sample starts in 1988 and financial policies and firm-
level risk may have contemporaneous effects on firm output as well as GDP.  In Section 8’s additional tests, we 
examine nine other alternatives for institutional variables– Judiciary Efficiency, Rule of Law, Corruption, 
Accounting Standard from La Porta et al. (1998), 1980 Stock Market Capitalization per GDP from Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), Ease of Doing Business Rank from the World Bank's doing business indicator
10
, investment 
sensitivity, share issue sensitivity, and debt issue sensitivity to Tobin’s Q from McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012).     
4.  Asset and Liability Structures 
In this section, we examine whether country-level characteristics or industry characteristics explain the financial 
structures of firms in different countries.  In addition to regressing the firm characteristics on the developed-country 
dummy variable, we include indicators for firm size and two industry classifications discussed above:  whether the 
firm produces in an industry classified as manufacturing and whether it is in a high-tech industry.  The 
manufacturing industry indicator picks up firms that are likely to have fixed assets that may serve as collateral. 
Similarly, firms in high-tech industries may be exposed to technological risks.  Both may affect cash and the choice 
of financial structures.  Our basic specification is:   
Yi,t = b0 + b1 Developed-Country Dummy i + b2 Manufacturing Dummy i + b3 High-Tech Dummy i + b4 Size Quintile 
i,t + Year Fixed Effects + e i,t  
The dependent variable Yi is a measure of firm i’s assets and liabilities structures.  Our Ys are firm size (natural log 
of total assets), cash/total assets, intangible assets/total assets, total liabilities/total assets, short-term liabilities/total 
                                                          
9
 We report the results using the developed-country dummy as the main country characteristic for two reasons.  
First, the coefficient on the developed-country dummy lends itself to easy interpretation.  The interaction terms 
between the developed-country dummy and other variables can be interpreted directly as a difference of 
slopes/sensitivities between two groups of population.  Second, because using the dummy illustrates clearly that our 
findings are apparent even when we use a very broad measure of institutional differences. 
10
 http://www.doingbusiness.org 
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liabilities, and short-term liabilities/current assets. We exclude the Size Quintile in the regression where Y is firm 
size.  Table 3 reports the results.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
We find that firms in developed countries hold more cash than do firms in developing countries.  In the Cash/Total 
Assets column, we estimate the coefficient on developed-country dummy at 6.609.  Since Table 1, Panel B, shows 
that the average cash-to-total-assets ratio is 17.32% globally, the 6.609% difference is economically large.  
Leverage is slightly lower in developed countries, but debt maturity is much shorter in developing countries.  In the 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets column, we estimate the coefficient on the developed-country dummy at -1.874%.  In 
the Short-Term Liabilities/Total Liabilities column, we estimate the coefficient on the developed-country dummy at 
-12.384%.  For comparison purposes, in Table 1, Panel B, the average leverage is 26.57% and the average short-
term liabilities ratio is 49.66%.  Therefore, firms in developing countries have much higher short-term liabilities 
relative to their total liabilities.  In the Current Liabilities/Current Assets column, the coefficient on the developed-
country dummy is -12.183%, suggesting that firms in rich countries have more conservative liquidity positions.       
Developed-country firms are slightly larger than are the developing-country firms in our sample.  In the Size 
column, the coefficient on the developed-country dummy is 0.047.  In the Intangible Assets/Total Assets column, 
we estimate the coefficient on the developed-country dummy at 6.582%.  Thus, firms in developed countries have 
more intangible assets relative to total assets.   
When we focus on the industry effects we find that firms in manufacturing industries hold less cash, have higher 
leverage, and have more short-term debts.  The high-tech dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the high-tech 
industry according to the American Electronic Association.  High-tech firms can be found in various sectors, 
including high-tech manufacturing, engineering services, and software development.  We find that firms in high-tech 
industries hold more cash and have lower leverage. 
We include Size Quintile as a control variable.  We construct the Size Quintile based on the global distributions of a 
firm’s total assets in USD in that year.  We find that larger firms hold less cash, have lower leverage, and have fewer 
short-term liabilities, but more intangible assets.   
Our regression analysis shows that firms in developed and developing countries have significantly different asset 
and liability structures.  Although developed countries have better financial systems and lower levels of country and 
industry risk, we find that firms in developed countries have more conservative financial policies, i.e., they have 
more cash, slightly lower leverage, and fewer short-term liabilities.  We also find that small firms, high-tech firms, 
and non-manufacturing firms also have more cash relative to their total assets.    
5.  Firm-Level Risk 
13 
 
Here, we examine firm-level risk, both in cross-section and in time-series in developing and developed countries, 
and the relation between firm-level, sector-level, and country-level risk.  Since we are exploring the relation between 
financial structures and risk, we adopt a similar reduced-form specification for both. 
5.1 Volatility  
We first estimate the following cross-sectional regressions:   
Vi = b0 + b1 Developed-Country Dummy i + b2 Manufacturing Dummy i + b3 High-Tech Dummy i + b4 Size Quintile 
i + e i  
We define annual growth rate G i,t as ln(X i,t) – ln(X i,t-1) where X represents firm characteristics and performance.  
We define the firm-level volatility, Vi, as the time-series standard deviation of the annual growth rate G i,t, 
 
           ̅   
   
 , where n is the number of years for which the data on growth rate G i,t are available.   ̅i is the average 
growth rate over the years.  In each year, we divide firms into the size quintiles based on their total assets that year.  
Since we are estimating a cross-sectional regression, the variable Size Quintile is the time-series average of size 
quintiles across all years.  Instead of studying risk using a single variable, we use the volatilities of eight variables.  
Our Xs include the firm financial structures of total assets, cash, intangible assets, total liabilities, and short-term 
liabilities; and also other outcome variables of sales, profit, and employment.  Using eight different variables ensures 
that our results are robust.  Each variable has its own strengths and weaknesses.  For example, volatility of profits is 
a more precise measure of firm performance variability but volatility of sales is less likely to be biased by earnings 
manipulation. We report the results in Table 4.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
We find that firms in developed countries are more volatile than are firms in developing countries.  The coefficients 
on the developed-country dummy are positive and significant in all columns, except for the intangible assets.   We 
estimate the coefficients at 0.038 for sales, 0.073 for total assets, 0.024 for cash, 0.064 for profit, -0.149 for 
intangible assets, 0.096 for total liabilities, 0.161 for short-term liabilities, and 0.043 for employment.  These 
numbers are large relative to the average volatilities.  Across all the dependent variables, the magnitude of the 
coefficients on developing countries is around 10% to 20% of average volatilities we show in Table 2, Panel B.   
We also find that firms in manufacturing industries are less volatile and that firms in high-tech industries are more 
volatile.  The coefficients on the manufacturing dummy are negative and significant in all columns.  We estimate the 
manufacturing coefficients at -0.098 for sales, -0.12 for total assets, -0.136 for cash, -0.034 for profit, -0.084 for 
intangible assets, -0.155 for total liabilities, -0.179 for short-term liabilities, and -0.072 for employment.  The 
coefficients on the high-tech dummy are positive and significant in most columns.  We estimate the high-tech 
coefficients at 0.064 for sales, 0.1 for total assets, -0.01 for cash, 0.05 for profit, 0.113 for intangible assets, 0.211 
for total liabilities, 0.169 for short-term liabilities, and 0.02 for employment.  We are not surprised to find higher 
volatilities in high-tech and lower volatilities in manufacturing industries.  High-tech industries, such as software, 
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computer, and biotech, are likely to experience higher degrees of innovation, uncertainty, and dynamism than are 
manufacturing industries, which include primitive industries such as food, textile, and other basic goods.  The 
coefficients on the Size Quintile are negative and significant in all columns, showing that large firms are less volatile 
than small firms.  This result is consistent with the conjecture that smaller, and perhaps younger, firms are riskier.   
In sum, our volatility results in Table 4 combined with our cash holding results in Table 3 support our conjecture 
that firms hold cash to accommodate real risk.  From Table 3, firms in developed countries, firms in high-tech/non-
manufacturing industries, and small firms have higher cash-to-total-assets ratios.  From Table 4, firms in developed 
countries, firms in high-tech/non-manufacturing industries, and small firms also have higher volatilities. 
5.2 Cross-Sectional Dispersion  
Firm-level volatilities can be driven by both systematic and idiosyncratic components.  Thus, firms may have high 
volatilities simply because country-level fundamentals such as inflation are volatile.  To test whether this is the case, 
we complement our volatilities results with cross-sectional dispersions results.  (We note that another advantage of 
using cross-sectional dispersion as a dependent variable is that it is only one observation per country-year.  So, all 
countries are given equal weights in the regressions.  Doing so ensures that our results in the previous sections are 
not just driven by observations from some large countries.)   Hence, we estimate the following panel regressions.  
Cc,t = b0 + b1 Developed-Country Dummy c + Year-Fixed Effects + e c,t  
Again, we define annual growth rate G i,t as ln(X i,t) – ln(X i,t-1) where X is firm i's characteristics and performance. 
We define the country c’s cross-sectional dispersion, Cc,t, as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the G i,t, 
 
           ̅     
   
 scaled by  ̅   .  n is the number of firms in country c at time t for which the data on G i,t are available.  
 ̅    is the average growth rate across all firms in country c in year t.  Table 5 reports the results.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Table 5 shows that dispersions of sales growth, assets growth, total debts growth, short-term liabilities growth, and 
employment growth are higher in developed countries.  The coefficients on the developed-country dummy are 
positive in all columns.  We estimate the coefficients at 0.317 for sales, 0.256 for total assets, 0.244 for cash, 0.233 
for profit, 0.04 for intangible assets, 0.368 for total liabilities, 0.46 for short-term liabilities, and 0.04 for 
employment.  These results are similar to the volatilities results in Table 4.  In addition, these coefficients suggest 
that the dispersion across countries is large relative to the dispersion within a country.  For example, an average 
cross-sectional dispersion of sales growth within a country is 1.15.  So, the difference between developed and 
developing countries is 27.6% (=0.317/1.15) of the average within country dispersion. 
5.3 Sector- and Country-Level Volatilities   
To examine aggregate risk in different countries we estimate the sector- and country-level version of the following 
regression. 
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Vs = b0 + b1 Developed-Country Dummy s + b2 Manufacturing Fraction s + b3 High-Tech Fraction s + e s   
Vc = b0 + b1 Developed-Country Dummy c + e c   
First, we average the firm-level growth rates within each sector s (based on 17 Fama-French industries) or within 
each country c.  We then use the average to compute the sector-level volatilities, Vs, or country- level volatilities, 
Vc.  Manufacturing Fraction is the fraction of firms in sector s that is a manufacturing firm.  High-Tech Fraction is 
the fraction of firms in sector s that is a high-tech firm.  Table 6 reports the results.  
 [INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Table 6, Panel A, shows that sector-level volatilities are lower in developed countries.  The coefficients on the 
developed-country dummy are negative in all columns. We estimate the coefficients at -0.056 for sales, -0.051 for 
total assets, -0.146 for cash, -0.086 or profit, -0.162 for intangible assets, -0.091 for total liabilities, -0.07 for short-
term liabilities, and -0.01for employment.  These results are opposite to the firm-level results in Table 4.  We find 
that most coefficients on Manufacturing Fraction and High-Tech Fraction are nonsignificant.  
Table 6, Panel B, shows that country-level volatilities are lower in developed countries. The coefficients on the 
developed-country dummy are negative in all columns. We estimate the coefficients at -0.085 for sales, -0.083 for 
total assets, -0.1 for cash, -0.107 or profit, -0.294 for intangible assets, -0.15 for total liabilities, -0.158 for short-term 
liabilities, and -0.008 for employment.  Again, these results are contrary to the firm-level results in Table 4. 
In sum, while firm-level volatilities are higher in developed countries, we find that the sector- and country-level 
volatilities are higher in developing countries.  Our findings are consistent with the widely accepted view (see Lucas 
(1988), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003), Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose (2006), Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2007), and Koren and Tenreyro (2007)) that developing economies are less stable.  
5.4 Competition and Firm-Level Risk 
In this section, we provide an example of the sources of firm-level risk.  We hypothesize that product market 
competition is a key factor that drives operating risk.  To illustrate this point, we use foreign entry as a proxy for 
competition and examine how foreign entry affects firm-level volatilities.  We augment the basic specification in 
Table 4 with a new variable, foreign entry. We measure foreign entry by sector-level inward cross-border M&As.  
Sectors are defined as 17 Fama-French industries.  For each sector in each country, we construct foreign entry by 
aggregating all inward cross-border M&As and scaling them by all (domestic and inward foreign) M&As.  Our 
sample covers all deals announced as completed in the SDC.  To avoid reverse causality, we compute the measure of 
foreign entry from 1989-1998 data while the firm-level volatilities are computed from the non-overlapping period of 
1999-2008 (as opposed to the full 1989-2008 sample in other specifications).  To ensure that foreign entry does not 
pick up time-invariant industry characteristics, we also control for the initial volatilities.  Initial volatilities are the 
sector averages of firm-level volatilities that we compute from 1989-1998 data.  A major advantage of using cross-
border M&As as a measure of foreign entry is the availability of detailed data across many industries and countries 
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during our sample period.  In addition, majority of foreign direct investments are mergers.  (According to 
UNCTAD’s FDI database, from 1988-2006, 62% of global FDIs are in the form of cross-border M&As.)  We report 
the results in Table 7, Panel A.   
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
We find that the coefficients on foreign entry are positive and significant for all variables (except profit).
 
(A possible 
explanation for a negative coefficient on profit is that a local firm’s profitability tends to decline after foreign firms 
enter.)  This finding means that industries with more foreign entries through cross-border M&As later experience 
higher firm-level risk.  We estimate the coefficients on foreign entry at 0.086 for sales, 0.078 for total assets, 0.161 
for cash, -0.063 for profit, 0.124 for intangible assets, 0.129 for total liabilities, 0.171 for short-term liabilities, and 
0.046 for employment.  For comparison purposes, the average foreign entry is 42% in our sample.  The sector with 
the highest average foreign entry is Machinery (61%) and the sector with the lowest foreign entry is Retail (32%).
11
  
The coefficients on developed-country, tradable, high-tech dummies, and size quintile have similar signs as the 
baseline estimates in Table 4.   
It is possible that our foreign entry measure captures something other than the effect of competition, such as market 
liberalization in certain countries or globalization of supply chains in certain sectors.  To address this concern, as a 
placebo test we replace foreign entry with foreign outflow. We define foreign outflow as the aggregate the volume 
of all outward cross-border M&As scaled by the volume of all (domestic and inward foreign) M&As.  The sector 
with the highest average foreign outflow is Machinery (56%) and the sector with the lowest foreign outflow is 
Chemicals (23%).  Although foreign entry and foreign outflow are positively correlated (34% correlation), the two 
have very different implications for domestic competition and risk of local firms.  We report the results in Table 7, 
Panel B.  We find that most coefficients on foreign outflow are not significant.  The magnitudes of the outflow 
coefficients are much smaller than those of the foreign entry.  
6. Drivers of Firm-Level Volatilities 
To examine whether cross-country difference in firm-level risk is more pronounced in firms and industries that are 
more subject to imperfections in financial markets, we propose that idiosyncratic risk is likely to be influenced by 
capital market imperfections as these imperfections can insulate incumbent firms from risk.  Some countries have 
economic institutions to alleviate these imperfections; others do not.  Therefore, we hypothesize that the cross-
country difference in risk is more pronounced in technology-intensive, external-finance-dependent, and large-firm-
dominated industries where we expect higher degrees of market imperfections.  Following the difference-in-
difference method in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we estimate the following regression.   
Vi = b0 + b1 Developed-Country Dummy i + b2 Industry Indicator i + b3 Developed-Country Dummy i x Industry 
Indicator i + b4 Size Quintile i + e i  
                                                          
11
 Utilities and financial services have lower inflow but they are excluded from our sample. 
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The industry indicators we use are a high-tech dummy, the external finance score from Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
and the small-firm industry score from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008). We report the results in 
Table 8. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
6.1 Technology 
Technology-intensive industries tend to be heavily affected by market imperfections.  For example, stockholders, 
creditors, and potential buyers who are in the market for corporate assets tend to be much less well-informed about a 
high-tech firm than are the insiders.  Such imperfections can prevent small firms from expanding and prevent new 
firms from entering.  Therefore, we expect to find that firm-level risk is lower for high-tech incumbents in a country 
without good institutions to overcome the information problems.  The cross-country difference in firm-level risk 
should be more pronounced in industries with higher degrees of product and capital market imperfections.   
In Table 8, Panel A confirms that firms in developed countries and small firms are more volatile.  The coefficients 
on the developed-country dummy are positive and significant in all columns, except for that of the intangible assets. 
The coefficients on the Size Quintile are negative and significant in all columns.  Their magnitudes are in line with 
those of the baseline models in Table 4.   
The key parameters here are the coefficients on the interaction terms between the developed country and high-tech 
dummies.  We find that the interaction coefficients are all positive.  We estimate the coefficients at 0.056 for sales, 
0.085 for total assets, 0.078 for cash, 0.077 for profit, 0.142 for intangible assets, 0.106 for total liabilities, 0.104 for 
short-term liabilities, and 0.021 for employment.  This finding means that the volatility difference between 
developed and developing countries is consistently larger in high-tech industries.   
The positive interaction coefficients suggest that poor institutions in developing countries can shield incumbent 
firms from risk.  These interaction terms can be interpreted as second derivatives.  For example, in low-tech 
industries, sales volatilities in developed countries are 0.041 higher than are sales volatilities in developing 
countries, while in high-tech industries, sales volatilities in developed countries are 0.097 (=0.041+0.056) higher 
than are sales volatilities in developing countries.  The interaction coefficient of 0.056 is economically large, 
compared to average sales volatilities of 0.419 shown in Table 2, Panel B.       
6.2 External Finance Dependency  
A prime example of market imperfections is financial constraints.  Firms in financially dependent industries in 
developing countries may not be able to raise the optimal amount of external capital necessary to compete with rival 
firms. The effect of this market imperfection may be to lower cash flow risk in those industries 
To examine whether financially dependent firms in developing countries are less risky, we adopt the external 
finance dependency score from Rajan and Zingales (1998). These authors construct the score from external 
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financing usage of listed firms in the United States during the 1980s, which is non-overlapped with our sample.  
Given that capital markets in the U.S. are highly developed, Rajan and Zingales suggest that their score can be 
considered the natural demand for external funds.  For example, the least external dependent industry is tobacco 
(score = -0.45) and the most external dependent industry is drugs (score = 1.49).  The major disadvantage of using 
this score is that the scores are only available for each of the 36 International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) manufacturing industries.  The number of observations in external dependency regressions is about 50% of 
what we have in Table 8 Panel A. 
Table 8, Panel B reports the results on external finance. As in Table 8, Panel A, the results confirm that firms in 
developed countries and small firms are more volatile.  The coefficients on the Size Quintile are negative and 
significant in all columns.  The coefficients on the developed-country dummy are generally positive.  However, the 
magnitude and significance are smaller than are those of the base-line models in Table 4.    
The coefficients on the interactions between the developed-country dummy and external finance dependency are 
positive and statistically significant in all columns. We estimate the interaction coefficients at 0.159 for sales, 0.155 
for total assets, 0.078 for cash, 0.188 for profit, 0.181 for intangible assets, 0.254 for total liabilities, 0.228 for short-
term liabilities, and 0.037 for employment.  This finding means that the volatility difference between developed and 
developing countries is consistently greater in industries that depend on external financing.  
To illustrate the magnitude of the interaction coefficients, we follow the example in Rajan and Zingales (1998).  
Machinery is the industry at the 75th percentile financial dependency (score = 0.45).  Beverages is the industry at the 
25th percentile dependency (score 0.08).  In developing countries, sales volatilities in machinery is 0.0244 = 0.066 x 
(0.45-0.08) higher than sales volatilities in beverages.  In developed countries, sales volatilities in machinery is   
0.083 = (0.066+0.159) x (0.45-0.08) higher than sales volatilities in beverages.   From Table 2 Panel B, the average 
sales volatility is 0.419.  Thus, the interaction effect is economically significant.   
The positive interaction coefficients are consistent with the notion that underdeveloped capital markets can reduce 
risk for incumbent firms.  In developing countries where small firms and potential entrants face severe financial 
constraints, existing firms in industries that require a large amount of external financing face lower competition.      
6.3 Small-Firm Dominance 
We expect to find that the effect of financial and institutional development on the intensity of competition differs 
across industries.  Industries that require economies of scale and that have large optimal firm size are more likely to 
be affected by poor institutions.  By contrast, even in developing countries industries with small firms are likely to 
be well served by financial and legal systems.  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008) suggest that for technological reasons, certain industries may 
have a larger share of small firms. We adopt their small-firm-share score.  Their score is defined as the share of 
industry’s employment by firms with less than 20 employees based on the 1992 U.S. Census data.  Given that 
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institutions in the U.S. are highly developed and that there are few policy distortions, Beck et al. suggest that their 
scores are based on the natural size distribution of firms.  For example, the industries with the least share of small 
firms are paper manufacturing (score = 0.14) and tobacco (score = 0.3).  The industry with the highest share of small 
firms is wood (score = 21.37). 
We report the results on small-firm industries in Table 8, Panel C. Similar to Table 8, Panel B, the number of 
observations in small-firm dominance regressions is about 50% of what we have in Table 8 Panel A. 
The coefficients on the interactions between the developed-country dummy and small-firm industry are negative in 
all columns. We estimate the interaction coefficients at -0.01 for sales, -0.01 for total assets, -0.006 for cash, -0.003 
for profit, -0.008 for intangible assets, -0.014 for total liabilities, -0.012 for short-term liabilities, and -0.003 for 
employment.  (However, we note that the interactions on cash, profit, and employment are not statistically 
significant.)  This finding means that the volatility difference between developed and developing countries is 
generally greater in industries that are dominated by large firms.   
To demonstrate the magnitude of the interaction coefficients, we examine the furniture industry, which is at the 75th 
percentile small firm share (score = 9.09), and the spinning industry, which is the industry at the 25th percentile 
small firm share (score 1.91).  In developing countries, the sales volatility in furniture is 0.007 = 0.001 x (9.09-1.91) 
lower than is the sales volatility in spinning.  In developed countries, the sales volatility in furniture is 0.079 = 
(0.001+0.01) x (9.09 -1.91) lower than is the sales volatility in spinning.  In Table 2, Panel B, we see that the 
average sales volatility is 0.419.  Therefore, the interaction effect is economically significant.   
The negative interaction coefficients imply that in developing countries where new entrants suffer more from poor 
institutions, existing firms in large-firm industries face lower risk.  This finding is consistent with our results on 
financial dependence, since there is a negative correlation between small-firm share and the dependency on external 
financing and a negative correlation between small-firm share and the high-tech dummy in our sample.   Small-firm 
industries tend to require less external financing and to have lower technological intensity. 
In sum, the cross-country difference in firm-level volatilities is more pronounced in industries with real and financial 
market imperfections. Under the Rajan-Zingales framework, the difference in firm-level volatilities between 
developed and developing countries is more pronounced in technology-intensive, financial-dependent, and large-
firm-dominated industries.  
6.4 Market Imperfections and Product Market Rivalry  
In this section we provide more direct evidence of a channel through which ease of access to financial markets and 
industry characteristics affect firm volatility. We show that high technology industries, industries that are dependent 
on external financing, and small firm dominated industries exhibit relatively less product market competition in 
developing countries than in developed countries.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that financial market 
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frictions slow the allocation of resources and thereby our measure of product market competition is market share 
volatilities of industry leaders.   
By construction, market share captures the rivalry effect – one firm’s market share always grows at the expense of 
another's.   We focus on the industry leaders because the coverage of WorldScope and other international databases 
varies over time.  Studying the market share of the largest firms helps us mitigate the effects of such changes in data 
coverage.  In each year, we identify the largest two firms in a four-digit SIC industry in each country.  Then, we 
track the size of these largest two firms over the next five years and compute the volatilities of market share based 
on the total assets of these two firms.   
Vi,t = b0 + b1 Developed-Country Dummy i + b2 Industry Indicator i + b3 Developed-Country Dummy i x Industry 
Indicator i + b4 Year t + e i,t 
Vi,t  is the market share volatility of the largest firm in year t.  We define market share as Total Assets of the Largest 
Firm/ (Total Assets of the Largest Firm+ Total Assets of the Second Largest Firm). We compute Vi,t from the market 
share from year t to t+5.  We regress market share volatilities, Vi,t, on the developed-country dummy, industry 
indicators (high-tech, external finance, and small firm industries), and the interactions between the developed-
country dummy and industry indicators.  Since our sample consists of only the largest firms, which generally have 
complete historical data, we are able to use Year as an explanatory variable to examine how these volatilities evolve 
over time.   
To ensure that our results are robust to the way we calculate market share volatilities, we also use market shares 
among the top five firms (Total Assets of the Largest Firm/ (Sum of Total Assets of the Largest Five Firms)) instead 
of the top two firms. We report the results in Table 8, Panel D.  The first three columns report the results from the 
top two firms’ market shares.  The last three columns report the results from the top five firms’ market shares.  
We find that market shares are less volatile in developing countries.  The reduction is the greatest in high-tech, in 
financially dependent industries, and in industries that are dominated by large firms.  We also find that volatilities 
increase over time.  
7. Reaction to Shocks  
In this section, we connect cross-country difference in financial structure in Section 4 to the underlying firm-level 
risk in Section 5 by examining how firms in developed and developing countries react to real shocks to industry 
productivity.  Following Wurgler (2000), we define productivity shocks as the percentage growth in value added. 
We construct our measure of productivity from the UNIDO database.  Wurgler (2000) studies the relation between 
growth in capital formation and growth in value added at the three-digit ISIC level (28 manufacturing industries.  
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However, in 2011, UNIDO published a more detailed data set (INDOSTAT-4 2011) at the four-digit ISIC level (127 
manufacturing industries).  Hence, we define our productivity shocks at the four-digit ISIC level.
12
    
There are several advantages to using productivity shocks from UNIDO.  First, the reverse causality problem is less 
severe.  Compared to Tobin’s Q or cash flow shocks at the firm level, UNIDO shocks are more exogenous.  Clearly, 
changes in a firm’s financial policies can affect both its own cash flow and Tobin’s Q.  UNIDO data come from 
surveys and registries that cover both public and private firms both inside and outside of our WorldScope sample.  
Hence, it is less likely that financial policies of one individual firm will affect our value-added measure.  Second, 
since our paper focuses on firm-level risk, studying the reaction to micro shocks is more relevant than studying the 
reaction to macro shocks.  Unlike shocks to GDP or stock market indexes that are the same for all firms in a country, 
there are 127 shocks for manufacturing firms in UNIDO. 
Our regression is as follows: 
G i,t = b0 + b1 Productivity Shock i,t + b2 Developed-Country Dummy i x Productivity Shock i,t + Firm Fixed Effects + 
e i,t 
We define annual growth rate G i,t as ln(X i,t) – ln(X i,t-1), where X represents the following firm characteristics and 
performance: assets, cash holdings, current assets, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, 
profit, and employment.  Since we focus on the coefficient of the interaction term b2, we include firm-fixed effects 
to absorb other country and industry characteristics.   
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
Table 9 reports the regression results.  We find that firms in developed countries are more responsive to exogenous 
real shocks.  All the coefficients on productivity shocks are positive and significant.  We interpret the coefficient b1 
as a developing-country firm’s sensitivity to productivity shocks.  For example, if value added changes by 1%, then 
firms in developing countries will experience a 0.124% change in sales, 0.09% change in assets, 0.128% change in 
cash, 0.216% change in profits, 0.094% change in intangible assets, 0.056% change in total debts, 0.081% change in 
short-term debts, and 0.06% change in employment.  All interaction coefficients except the one in the employment 
regression
13
 are positive, which suggests that firms in developed countries are more responsive to shocks.   
                                                          
12
 Our matching procedure is as follows.  First, we compute productivity shocks for each four-digit ISIC industry.  
Then, we match each firm to the appropriate ISIC industry (or industries) based on its four-digit SIC code.  Because 
the four-digit SIC does not correspond to the four-digit ISIC one to one, we use the average productivity shocks 
across all corresponding ISICs when there is more than one ISIC assigned to one four-digit SIC.  We note that the 
limitation of UNIDO is that it only covers some manufacturing industries. Thus, we can only use about 30% of our 
firm-year observations in this section. 
13
 We note that productivity shocks have ambiguous impacts on employment.  If productivity increases come from 
improvement in production technology, then firms might employ fewer workers to produce the same or higher levels 
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We interpret the sum of coefficients b1 and b2 as a developed-country firm’s sensitivity to productivity shocks.  If 
the value added changes by 1%, then firm in developed countries will experience a 0.265 (= 0.124+0.141) % change 
in sales, 0.24 (= 0.09+0.15) % change in assets, 0.383 (= 0.128+0.255) % change in cash, 0.47 (= 0.216+0.254) % 
change in profits, 0.244  (= 0.094+0.15) % change in intangible assets, 0.164 (= 0.056+0.108) % change in total 
debts, 0.158 (= 0.081+0.077) % change in short-term debts, and a 0.053 (= 0.06-0.007) % change in employment. 
Across all types of assets and liabilities, most of the adjustments (the largest b1 and b2) come from cash balance.  
This result suggests that firms hold cash to accommodate their firm-level risk.  Firms use cash as a buffer asset.  
During expansion periods, firms accumulate cash.  During contraction periods, firms lessen bad shocks by spending 
cash disproportionately.  This result is also consistent with the findings in Sections 4 and 5 that firms in developed 
countries face higher risk and hence hold more cash.  Theoretically, instead of using cash, firms can borrow more 
(especially short-term) to reduce the effect of bad shocks.  We do not find such evidence in our manufacturing firm 
sample.  Both total and short-term debts respond positively to productivity shocks, indicating that debt is mostly 
used to finance growth rather than to relieve financial distress.      
In sum, we show that firms in developed countries are more responsive to shocks.  Across all types of assets and 
liabilities, most of the adjustments come from cash balance.  Our results suggest that operating risk is an important 
determinant of a firm’s financial policies. 
8.  Additional Tests 
8.1 Industry Analysis for Cash Holdings 
To we examine whether cash holdings are consistent with our findings on firm-level risk,  we regress cash ratio 
(cash holding scaled by total assets) on dependent variables similar to those in Tables 7 Panels A-B and 8 Panels A-
C.  Since we have a panel data set on cash ratios, we include the year fixed effects in all regressions.  The results are 
reported in Table 10. 
We find that the cross-country differences in cash holdings are more pronounced in high-tech, external-finance-
dependent, and large-firm-dominated industries.   Firms in sectors with more foreign entries during 1989-1998 hold 
slightly more cash after 1999 while firms in sectors with more foreign outflows during 1989-1998 hold less cash 
after 1999.  These results are consistent with the notion that cash ratios are chosen to accommodate firm-level risk.     
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
In the first column, the interaction term between the developed-country dummy and the high-tech dummy is positive 
and significant.  This finding means that the cash ratio differences between developed and developing countries are 
larger in high-tech industries.  Consistent with the results in Section 4, we find that firms in developed countries, 
high-tech industries, and small firms hold more cash.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of outputs.  But if increases in productivity come from higher demands, then firms may have to employ more 
workers to meet the firm's needs. 
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In the second column, the interaction term between the developed-country dummy and the external finance 
dependency score is positive and significant.  In the third column, the interaction term between the developed-
country dummy and the small-firm dominance score is negative and significant.  These results suggest that the 
cross-country difference in cash ratio is larger in external-finance-dependent and large-firm-dominated industries. 
In the fourth and fifth columns, we restrict our sample to cash ratios after 1999 since we construct our foreign inflow 
and outflow measurements for the 1989-1998 period.  We find that the coefficient on foreign inflow is positive.  
Foreign inflow raises cash holdings, but foreign outflow lowers cash holdings in the next decade.  Consistent with 
the results in Section 4, we find that firms in developed countries, high-tech industries, and small firms hold more 
cash.  Firms in manufacturing industries hold less cash.  
In sum, our difference-in-difference analysis for cash holdings yields results consistent with the difference-in-
difference analysis for firm-level risk.   
 
8.2 Alternative Measures for Country Characteristics 
Institutions in developing and developed countries differ on many dimensions, only some of which are relevant to 
financial markets.  Hence, we examine whether our results are driven by institutional differences that have been 
found to be associated with a well-functioning financial market.  Wurgler (2000) shows that there are major 
differences in the response of corporate investment and financing to market signals across countries.  We investigate 
whether there is a relation between the responsiveness to market signals in an economy and the riskiness of the 
firms’ cash flows, and cash holdings.  We do this directly, using measures developed by McLean, Zhang, and Zhao 
(2012), who argue that investment and external finance in countries with better institution increase more strongly 
with Tobin’s Q that captures investment opportunities.  These authors provide country-level estimates of the 
sensitivity of investment, share issuances, and debt issuances to Tobin’s Q as a measure of interfirm resource 
allocation efficiency.  However, since these sensitivities may themselves be endogenous and depend on product 
market characteristics in different economies, we also consider six additional institutional variables that are 
associated with efficient financial systems: Judiciary Efficiency, Rule of Law, Corruption, Accounting Standard 
from La Porta et. al (1998), 1980 Log of Per Capita GDP from World Development Indicator Database, 1980 Stock 
Market Capitalization per GDP from Rajan and Zingales (1998), and a direct measure of the cost of competing in 
each country,  the  Ease of Doing Business Rank from the World Bank's Doing Business indicator. 
 
 [INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
First, we estimate the effects of institutional variables on cash holdings by replacing the developed-country dummy 
in Section 4 with institutional variables. We report the results in Table 11 Panel A.   
We confirm that firms in countries with better institutions hold more cash.  The coefficients on institutional 
variables are estimated at -0.068 for Ease of Doing Business Rank, a lower rank means better institutions, 1.697 for 
Judiciary Efficiency, 1.715 for Rule of Law, 1.624 for Corruption, 0.122 for Accounting Standards, 1.87 for Log of 
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Per Capita GDP in 1980, 4.466 for Stock Market Capitalization/GDP in 1980, 27.77 for Investment-Q Sensitivity, 
10.31 for Share Issue-Q Sensitivity, and 9.32 for Debt Issue-Q Sensitivity.  All coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  These estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation improvement in institutional 
variables is associated with an increase in cash-to-total-assets by 3.18% for Ease of Doing Business Rank, 3.68% for 
Judiciary Efficiency, 4.26% for Rule of Law, 3.63% for Corruption, 2.27% for Accounting Standard, 2.49% for Log 
of Per Capita GDP in 1980, 1.52% for Stock Market Capitalization/GDP in 1980,  1.36% for Investment-Q 
Sensitivity, 1.72% for Share Issue-Q Sensitivity, and 1.87% for Debt Issue-Q Sensitivity.  The coefficients on other 
control variables are similar to those in the regressions with the developed-country dummy.   
To estimate the effects of institutional variables on firm-level risk we use sales growth volatility as a proxy for firm-
level risk, Vi.  (In unreported regressions, volatilities of other variables yield qualitatively similar results.)  We 
replace the developed-country dummy in Section 5.1 with institutional variables and report the results in Table 11, 
Panel B.   
We confirm that firms in countries with better institutions have higher volatilities. We estimate the coefficients on 
institutional variables at -0.001 for Ease of Doing Business Rank, 0.014 for Judiciary Efficiency, 0.03 for Rule of 
Law, 0.025 for Corruption, 0.004 for Accounting Standard, 0.027 for Log of Per Capita GDP in 1980, 0.115 for 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP in 1980, 1.98 for Investment-Q Sensitivity, 0.57 for Share Issue-Q Sensitivity, and 
0.43 for Debt Issue-Q Sensitivity.  All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.  These estimates 
imply that a one-standard-deviation improvement in institutional variables is associated with an increase in sales 
growth volatility by 0.047 for Ease of Doing Business Rank, 0.03 for Judiciary Efficiency, 0.075 for Rule of Law, 
0.056 for Corruption, 0.074 for Accounting Standard, 0.067 for Log of Per Capita GDP in 1980, 0.039 for Stock 
Market Capitalization/GDP in 1980, 0.1 for Investment-Q Sensitivity, 0.097 for Share Issue-Q Sensitivity, and 0.088 
for Debt Issue-Q Sensitivity.  The coefficients on other control variables are similar to the ones we use in the 
regressions with the developed-country dummy. 
When compared across measures, Rule of Law yields the highest R-squared and t-statistic in the cash holding 
regressions.  Resource allocation efficiency yields the highest R-squared and t-statistic in the volatility regressions.  
However, the estimates are comparable for all institutional variables.  These results suggest that real and financial 
market imperfections tend to be correlated with allocative inefficiency.  It is likely that both types of imperfections 
lead to less cash and lower firm-level risk.  
8.3 Effects of Volatilities on Cash Holding 
When we examine the relation between cash holding and firm-level risk directly, we note that one of the reasons that 
firms hold cash is to respond to unforeseen operating cash flow shortfalls.  For the U.S., existing literature provides 
evidence for this precautionary demand for cash by showing a positive relation between firms’ cash holdings and the 
cash flow volatility of the industry in which the firm operates.  A generalization suggests that firms in developing 
countries should hold more cash.  However, as we see above, this is not the case.  Lower cash holdings in 
developing countries might suggest that either the precautionary demand theory of demand for cash is not robust, or 
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that other factors, such as differences in agency costs, are great enough to overcome the effect of higher operating 
risks.  We consider another possibility: that the precautionary demand theory of cash holdings is correct, but that the 
natural estimates of the risks confronting the firm are confounded by the inverse relation between firm and industry 
cash flow risk across the world.  
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE] 
In Table 12, Panel A, we augment our cash-holding regressions in Section 4 by using country-level aggregate 
volatility, sector-level aggregate volatility, and firm-level volatility.  As in Section 5, we define country-
level volatility as the standard deviation of average sales growth in one country, sector-level volatility as the 
standard deviation of average sales growth in one sector.  Again, we define sectors as the 17 Fama-French 
industries in one country.  We define firm-level volatility as the standard deviation of firm-level sales growth.  To 
alleviate the endogeneity problem, we average firm-level volatilities across all firms in one sector before including 
them in a regression.   
In the first two columns, for the sake of comparison, we restrict the sample to firms in the U.S.  In other columns, 
we use the full sample of international firms.  In Column 1, we estimate the coefficient on sector-level volatility at 
5.63 with a t-statistic of 2.07.  In Column 2, we estimate the coefficient on firm-level volatility at 29.17 with a t-
statistic of 45.28.  These results show that sector- and firm-level volatilities lead to more cash holding in the 
U.S., and that firm-level volatility has a larger impact on cash holding.  
In the next two columns, we use country- and sector-level aggregate volatilities as proxies for risk in cross-country 
regressions.  In the third column, we estimate the coefficient on country-level aggregate volatility at -3.99.  In the 
fourth column, we estimate the coefficient on sector-level volatility at -2.18.  These negative coefficients imply that 
firms in countries and sectors with higher aggregate volatilities appear to hold less cash.  We argue that these 
counter-intuitive results arise because countries with low aggregate volatilities generally have higher firm-level risk.   
In the fifth column, we use firm-level volatility as a proxy for risk.  The coefficient on firm-level volatility is 
estimated at 10.1 with a t-statistic of 56.04.  This finding confirms that the cross-country (inverse) relation between 
aggregate and firm-level risk drives the results in Columns 3 and 4.   
We address the concern that we compute volatilities and cash holdings from the same time period.  We do so by 
splitting the sample in half.  We then compute the firm-level volatilities from the data from 1989-1998 and use the 
sample to cash ratios from the non-overlapping period of 1999-2008 for the regressions.  We report the result in 
Column 6.  The coefficient on non-overlapping firm-level volatility is still significant at the 1% level. 
Table 12 Panel A highlights that the distinction between aggregate- and firm-level risks has a crucial implication for 
the study of international cash holding.  Sector- and country-level volatilities should not be used as a proxy for firm-
level risk in the cross-country context.  The misspecification not only underestimates the effect of risk on cash 
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holding, but also the negative correlations between aggregate and firm-level volatilities also lead to a coefficient 
with the wrong sign.    
In Table 12, Panel B, we add the firm characteristics to the cash-holding regressions with firm-level volatilities.   
Following other studies on the determinants of cash holding, we include lagged Leverage, Dividend Dummy, 
Capital Expenditure/Total Assets, Acquisitions/Total Assets, R&D/Total Assets, and Tobin’s Q as explanatory 
variables.  All additional data are from the WorldScope database.  We find that firms with lower leverage, dividend, 
capital expenditure, and acquisition hold more cash, as do firms with more R&D and higher Tobin’s Q.  The signs 
and magnitudes of the coefficients on firm characteristics are consistent with prior research.  The coefficients on 
firm-level volatility, the developed-country high-tech, and manufacturing dummies, and the size quintile remain 
large and statistically significant at 1% level.  The firm characteristic that has the largest impact on cash holding is 
R&D intensity.  Clearly, R&D may capture the effects of firm-level risk itself.  
In Table 12, Panel B confirms that cash holding increases with firm-level volatility.  Even after we control for the 
arguably endogenous firm-level variables, firm-level volatility constructed at the sector level is still statistically 
significant. 
8.4 Alternative Explanations 
8.4.1 Agency Explanations 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) document that firms in countries with poorer shareholder-rights 
protection tend to hold more cash.  To verify that our results are not confounded with shareholder protection, we 
include the shareholder protection index from La Porta et al. (1998) in all regressions from Tables 3 and 4.  We find 
that all our coefficients remain highly significant.  We are interested to note that our results that firms in developed 
countries hold more cash are not in conflict with Dittmar et al.'s (2003) results that firms in countries with poorer 
governance hold more cash.  In fact, we find that the correlations between shareholder protection and developed-
country dummies and the correlations between shareholder protection and other institutional indictors are low or 
negative.  For example, some developed countries such as Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland are classified as low 
shareholder-rights countries while some developing countries such as Colombia and India are classified as high 
shareholder-rights countries.   
Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010) reexamine the legal data and revise the shareholder protection index in 
La Porta et al. (1998).  We also control for the updated indices in the cash and volatility regressions.  The new 
indices we adopted are Djankov et al. (2008)’s index as well as the 1997 and 2005 values of Spamann (2010)’s 
investor protection index.  Our results that firms in developed countries hold more cash and have higher volatilities 
do not change after the inclusion of the new indices.   
We also use control-ownership disparity as a proxy for firm-level corporate governance and study its effect on cash 
holding.  Specifically, we use the ratios between control right and cash-flow right of the largest shareholder from 
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Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) which cover the sample of firms in East Asia.  Larger disparity between 
ownership and control indicates a greater degree of agency problems.  Approximately half of our East Asian firms 
whose data on ownership are available have control-to-cash-flow-right ratios greater than one.  We include control-
ownership disparity in all regressions from Tables 3 and 4 and find no evidence that firms with high control-
ownership disparity hold less cash.  So, it is unlikely that our cash-holding results are driven by agency-prone Asian 
firms with high control-ownership disparity.  For risk, we do find that firms with high control-ownership disparity 
are less volatile. 
8.4.2 Other Explanations 
While our explanation of international cash holdings is not mutually exclusive with transaction demand explanation 
(Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2003) and political extraction explanation (Caprio, Faccio, and McConnell, 
2012), it is unlikely that our results will be subsumed by alternative stories.  First, if facilitating business transaction 
is the sole reason why a firm holds cash, then we should observe that cash holdings decline over time.  
Technological improvement in financial service industries should allow business transactions to be completed more 
efficiently, which would mean that firms would not have to hold a large cash balance.  However, we find no 
evidence that cash holdings decline over time.  Second, compared to manufacturing firms whose output can be 
exported internationally, non-manufacturing firms such as transportation and telecommunications are more likely to 
be involved with domestic governments.  Non-manufacturing firms are also more likely to rely on government 
services and to be subjected to government regulations.  Therefore, these firms should be more likely to be affected 
by political rent extraction.  However, we find that compared to manufacturing firms, non-manufacturing firms hold 
more cash.  
One concern might be that our cross-country variation in cash holdings is driven by the difference in interest rates 
between developed and developing countries.  However, cost of capital alone is not the overriding determinant of 
cash holding.  We find that small firms and firms in external-finance-dependent industries hold more cash, even 
though these firms are likely to face the highest cost of capital.  This result is more consistent with our operating risk 
explanation.  To test this conjecture further, we explicitly include lending rates and interest rate spreads from the 
World Development Indicator Database in all regressions from Tables 3 and 4.  We find that firms in low-interest-
rate countries have more cash, more current assets, more current liabilities, and slightly higher firm-level 
risk.  However, the magnitude and significance of other coefficients remains largely unchanged.  We also find a 
negative correlation between per capita GDP and lending rate (-10%).  This finding supports the notion that the 
lending rate itself can be considered a financial development indicator.  (For instance, a narrow lending spread 
means the banking sector is well functioning.  Countries that allow free capital flow are likely to have a lower risk-
free rate.)  Low interest rates may encourage entries and facilitates competitions among established businesses.  
Thus, firms in low-interest-rate countries have to hold more cash to accommodate product market risks. 
Taxes in different countries may affect financial structures and firms’ attitude towards risk.  For example, Caprio, 
Faccio, and McConnell (2012) suggest that foreign investors from high-tax countries may want firms in low-tax 
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countries to hold a large amount of cash to avoid repatriation taxes.  Therefore, we control for corporate tax rates 
explicitly in all regressions from Tables 3 and 4. We obtain the data on tax rates from KPMG Corporate Tax Survey.  
First, we find that on average, developed countries have higher corporate tax rates than do developing countries.  
The correlation between the per-capita GDP and tax rate is positive (29%).  Second, we find that firms in high-tax 
countries hold more cash.  We also find that firms in high-tax countries have slightly higher leverage.  Third, firms 
in high-tax countries have slightly higher volatilities compared to firms in low-tax countries.  Thus, we find no 
evidence that our findings are confounded with tax considerations. 
8.5 Robustness Tests 
We perform various robustness tests in the internet appendix.  This section highlights some of the important tests.  
The details are reported in Internet Appendix A.    
We examine alternative specifications of the asset and liability structure regressions in Table 3 and the firm-level 
volatility regressions in Table 4.  To fully control for industry effects, we replace industry indicators with two-digit 
SIC industry fixed effects.  To check whether our country dummy captures the degree of economic and institutional 
development, we use per capita GDP in 1980 instead of a developed country dummy.  In Table 8 where we study the 
interactions between country and industry indicators, we include both country and industry fixed effects to absorb all 
level effects and focus on the interaction effects.   Our results are robust across these alternative specifications. 
In addition to size quintile, we also use the exact firm size (natural log of total assets or market capitalization).  One 
might be concerned that size distributions of firms differ across countries and that we only compare the largest firms 
in developing countries with average firms in developed countries.  So, we replace size quintile with (1) the size 
relative to other firms in its country and (2) the size relative to other firms in its local sector.  To address the concern 
that firms in different countries go public at different stages in their life cycles, we control for firm age.  Using 
alternative measures of firm size and controlling for firm age do not affect our main results.  In Table 8, we also 
interact firm size with country and industry indicators.  We find that the interactions between country and industry 
indicators are still highly significant.  
Our main sample covers countries in WorldScope with a large number of observations.  To verify that our results are 
not sample specific, we estimate the regressions in Tables 3 and 4 using alternative country samples: (1) the entire 
WorldScope and (2) all the countries in WorldScope with greater than 1,000 firm-year observations or 100 firms. (3) 
We also ensure that our results are not just driven by firms from some large developed countries by excluding 
countries with the most observations: the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Canada.  Notwithstanding the sample changes these 
additional restrictions imply, our main results still hold.   
For standard errors, we compute heteroscedasticity robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich 
estimators.  In addition to robust standard errors, we estimate the standard errors with clusters on country and 
industry where each industry is defined as a two-digit SIC group.  In the asset and liability structure regressions, we 
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also cluster standard errors by firm.  Inferences based on alternative standard errors again yield statistically 
significant results.  
We use alternative definitions of volatilities in Table 4.  (1) One might be concerned that firms with high average 
growth rates will automatically have high volatilities.  So, we scale volatilities by means before running the 
regressions.  (2) To address the concern that the data we use to compute volatilities are less complete in certain 
countries, for each firm we count the number of years in which the data are available and explicitly control for them 
in the regressions.  (3) We use firm characteristics denominated in U.S. dollars.  To address the concern that our 
results are driven by exchange rate movements, we compute firm-level risk in local currencies.  (4) Percentage 
growth in profits is not defined when earnings are less than zero.  To solve this problem, we use an alternative 
measure of variation in profitability: we compute the volatilities of ROAs (level) instead of profits growth.  (5) 
Another concern is that fundamentals of firms in emerging markets are in fact very volatile but their financial 
statements do not reflect the true fundamentals.  In Table 4, we already study volatilities of eight different variables 
including sales and employment which are more difficult to manipulate.  To further alleviate this concern, we try 
subtracting increase in accounts receivable from sales growth to eliminate the possibility of credit sales 
manipulation.  (6) We also examine the survival rates of firms in different countries as an alternative measure of 
risk.  Our results are robust across all alternative measures of volatilities.  
In Table 7, we use several proxies for international competition in addition to foreign entry.  It is likely that cross-
listed and export-oriented firms have more exposure to global competition.  So, we examine the volatilities of cross-
listed and export-oriented firms.  We also use privatization of state-owned enterprises as an alternative proxy of 
increases in local competitive pressure.  All results confirm that firms in competitive environment are more volatile.  
In Table 12, we control for factors that determine a firm’s alternatives to cash: ownership (the fraction of shares that 
are closely-held and family business group membership), organizational structure (diversified conglomerate status), 
and bank relationship (whether a firm has bank loans on the balance sheet).  Our findings survive the inclusion of 
these additional controls. 
We estimate several variations of the reaction-to-shock regressions in Table 9.  (1) We use growth in output and 
labor productivity (output per worker) as alternative proxies for productivity shock. (2) We divide the sample based 
on the country dummy and firm size quintile and run the same regressions using different subsamples.  (3) One 
might be concerned that firm reactions in developed and developing countries are not comparable because the 
productivity shocks are of different sizes.  To account for this possibility, we perform the analysis using a matched 
sample: we directly assign each observation in developing countries a developed country match based on 
productivity quartile, sector, year, and firm size.  Our findings hold across all these robustness checks. 
9.  Conclusion  
While developing economies are more volatile, several authors show that firms in developed countries hold more 
cash and have fewer short-term liabilities.  In this paper, we propose a new explanation for this relation.    
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We find that despite the fact that sector- and country-level averages are less volatile in developed countries, the 
performance and characteristics of individual firms in developed countries are more volatile.  
Idiosyncratic risk is likely to be influenced by imperfections in product and capital markets, as these imperfections 
can insulate incumbent firms from risk because they reduce the ability of competitors to contest product markets by 
aggressive investment.  We find that cross-country difference in firm-level volatilities and the intensity of product 
market competition are more pronounced in technology-intensive, external-finance-dependent, and large-firm-
dominated industries.  These are the industries in which we expect the higher level of market imperfections in 
developing countries.  Consistent with this finding, entry into markets by foreign competitors is associated with 
increased volatility.    
We link cross-country differences in financial structures to the underlying firm-level risk by examining how firms 
react to real shocks.  We find that firms in developed countries are more responsive to exogenous real shocks.  
Across all types of assets and liabilities, most of the adjustments come from cash balances.   
The results in this paper also advance our understanding of comparative volatilities and international financial 
policies.  Prior studies almost unanimously show that aggregate volatility is greater in the developing world.  
Paradoxically, we find that firm-level risk in developing countries is lower, even though the industry and macro-
risks in those countries are higher.  Thus, the differences in the firms’ financial policies across countries are not only 
a direct effect of differences in access to financial markets, but also occur because firms in those countries, 
especially firms in financially dependent industries, face lower operating risk as an indirect result of financial 
imperfections.  
More broadly, we show that the cross-country difference in cash-flow risk is an important factor that must be taken 
into consideration if we are to understand the effects of institutional factors such as agency costs, taxes, and capital 
market development.  Our results suggest that as economic institutions in developing countries strengthen, there will 
be increases in firm-level operating volatility.  This increase will put additional pressure on corporate governance in 
these countries, and will require adjustments to financial policies and governance structures. 
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Table 1 Panel A: Asset and Liability Structures by Country 
             
Country 
Number of 
Firm-Year 
Observations 
1980 Per 
Capita 
GDP Size 
Cash/Total 
Assets 
Intangible 
/Total 
Assets 
Total 
Liabilities 
/Total 
Assets 
Current/Total 
Liabilities  
Current 
Liabilities 
/Current Assets 
Developing Countries 
        Argentina 844 7551 5.04 7.91 3.08 23.34 56.84 43.66 
Brazil 3,347 3557 5.52 10.49 1.83 29.82 55.04 58.74 
Chile 1,692 2520 4.84 7.3 2.84 20.33 47.94 36.65 
China 15,171 186 5.08 17.73 3.95 27.58 80.13 57.32 
Colombia 345 1621 5.47 6.88 2.81 13.03 50.86 20.59 
Egypt 290 882 5.8 15.03 4.77 24 47.13 33.97 
Hungary 359 3769 4.49 11.36 5.25 15.55 62.17 23.73 
India 10,648 229 4.15 6.8 1.87 33.24 42.63 29.87 
Indonesia 3,305 397 4.33 11.89 1.57 38.59 59.31 68.88 
Korea 10,797 3358 5.25 13.36 2.3 31.21 61.04 44.33 
Lithuania 22 n.a. 4.61 7.57 2.45 30.33 39.1 42.1 
Malaysia 9,281 1848 4.35 12.13 4.17 26.61 65.13 48.82 
Mexico 1,771 5114 6.41 7.78 6.84 24.23 41.31 34.86 
Peru 802 2256 4.37 6.17 4.65 24.32 60.18 43.3 
Philippines 1,764 989 4.04 11.54 4.12 24.62 61.43 65.69 
Poland 1,994 n.a. 3.92 10.97 4.87 19.33 61.58 23.89 
Russia 790 n.a. 6.81 8.84 4.6 24.44 50.29 39.17 
South Africa 4,617 3463 4.42 13.11 7.05 16.81 49.69 22.27 
Thailand 5,195 796 4.24 9.01 2.34 36.47 64.58 72.45 
Turkey 2,066 2525 4.75 9.59 2.4 23.95 68.22 31.17 
Venezuela 244 5820 5.1 9.42 1.34 14.22 55.53 20.95 
Developed Countries                 
Australia 13,353 14291 3.22 25.07 12.2 17.51 43.07 25.74 
Austria 1,411 15946 5.21 13.04 5.84 24.84 52.41 29.51 
Belgium 1,953 15609 5.19 14.09 10.24 25.9 46.96 27.68 
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Canada 16,376 16751 4.03 18.84 9.72 22.94 38.34 37.18 
Czech Republic 292 n.a. 5.13 6.72 1.72 21.57 62.55 41.86 
Denmark 2,349 19716 4.82 16.29 5.72 27.04 43.35 25.76 
Finland 2,229 15576 5.27 13.45 10.09 28.73 34.18 20.3 
France 11,986 15982 4.98 14.15 12.81 22.66 49.29 19.66 
Germany 11,572 15656 4.82 14.26 9.58 21.09 50.73 22.69 
Greece 3,595 11079 4.46 9.31 3.13 26.49 66.94 34.89 
Hong Kong 8,554 11880 4.7 20.92 4.07 21.54 63.47 32.65 
Ireland 1,146 9957 4.52 17.1 14.19 22.82 42.7 25.28 
Israel 1,545 12603 4.98 25.51 8.37 23.35 49.35 26.82 
Italy 3,602 13094 6.01 12.5 10.96 26.35 54.37 29.07 
Japan 55,624 23982 5.78 18.28 1.47 25.85 57.89 31.02 
Netherlands 3,250 15936 5.5 11.86 8.39 23.57 43.67 20.13 
New Zealand 1,231 10265 4.36 9.07 10.33 25.3 35.9 28.88 
Norway 2,747 22301 4.91 18.87 9.19 31.31 27.99 24.24 
Portugal 1,084 6301 5.24 5.84 9.68 29.69 48.26 44.39 
Singapore 5,714 9043 4.41 17.58 2.51 21.18 62.64 31.15 
Spain 2,194 8826 6.02 9.41 6.33 23.51 51.89 30.48 
Sweden 5,002 19330 4.36 18.01 15.79 20.04 35.3 15.87 
Switzerland 3,277 28206 5.79 16.42 7.31 24.82 37.23 17.92 
United Kingdom 27,141 15575 4.22 16.18 11.42 20.11 49.87 24.52 
United States 108,575 22568 4.55 21.18 15.24 31.11 37.51 41.09 
         This table reports average asset and liability structures of firms in each country.  Cash, Total Assets, Intangible Assets, Total Liabilities, Current Liabilities, and 
Current Assets are from the WorldScope Database.  Size is defined as log of total assets (book value).  1980 Per Capita GDP is from the World Development 
Indicators Database.   Countries are classified by the World Bank's Atlas method.   Developed Country is defined as a high-income economy and Developing 
Country is defined as a middle-income economy or lower. 
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Table 1 Panel B: Asset and Liability Structures in Developed and Developing Countries 
 
Financial Structure 
Global 
Average 
Developed 
Country 
Average 
Developing 
Country 
Average 
Developed 
Minus 
Developing t-Stat 
Observations 
in Developed 
Countries 
Observations 
in 
Developing 
Countries 
Size 4.76 4.77 4.75 0.02** (2.3935) 288325 74734 
Cash/Total Assets 17.32 18.71 11.94 6.77*** (82.79) 286831 74469 
Intangible /Total Assets 8.35 9.73 3.38 6.35*** (98.7415) 252878 70206 
Total Liabilities /Total Assets 26.57 26.08 28.44 -2.36*** (18.0385) 278730 72813 
Current/Total Liabilities  49.66 46.42 61.27 -14.85*** (100.8583) 242336 67607 
Current Liabilities /Current Assets 35.7 32.79 46.79 -14*** (38.3312) 275409 72103 
        This table compares asset and liability structures of firms in developed and developing countries.  Cash, Total Assets, Intangible Assets, Total Liabilities, Current 
Liabilities, and Current Assets are from the WorldScope database.  Size is defined as log of total assets (book value).  Countries are classified by the World 
Bank's Atlas method.  Developed Country is defined as a high-income economy and Developing Country is defined as a middle-income economy or lower.  
Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics from univariate comparisons between developed and developing countries.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 Panel A: Firm-Level Risk by Country 
 
Country 
Number of 
Firms 
1980 Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Volatility 
of Sales 
Growth 
Volatility 
of Assets 
Growth 
Volatility 
of  Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility 
of  Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of  
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of  
Total Debts 
Growth 
Volatility 
of  Short-
Term 
Liabilities 
Volatility of  
Employment 
Growth 
Developing Countries 
          Argentina 80 7551 0.47 0.32 0.98 0.65 1.06 0.93 1.33 0.15 
Brazil 373 3557 0.39 0.35 1.18 0.7 1.06 0.74 0.92 0.25 
Chile 147 2520 0.36 0.21 1.14 0.54 1.06 0.63 0.91 0.26 
China 1,843 186 0.34 0.28 0.84 0.45 0.89 0.6 0.67 0.28 
Colombia 31 1621 0.23 0.23 0.76 0.5 1.22 1.04 1.4 0.2 
Egypt 46 882 0.21 0.21 0.83 0.35 0.8 0.49 0.62 0.05 
Hungary 38 3769 0.39 0.27 0.92 0.65 0.79 0.74 0.96 0.27 
India 1,995 229 0.26 0.23 0.97 0.42 0.9 0.53 0.9 0.14 
Indonesia 310 397 0.38 0.28 1 0.75 0.76 0.69 1.01 0.26 
Korea 1,152 3358 0.38 0.32 0.93 0.73 1.15 0.69 0.94 0.22 
Lithuania 5 n.a. 0.17 0.16 0.84 0.52 0.65 0.43 0.89 0.18 
Malaysia 969 1848 0.41 0.29 0.93 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.89 0.27 
Mexico 154 5114 0.26 0.22 0.86 0.58 0.84 0.63 1.08 0.17 
Peru 83 2256 0.31 0.25 1.16 0.61 0.95 0.87 1.12 0.33 
Philippines 157 989 0.54 0.37 1.09 0.9 0.66 0.69 0.99 0.41 
Poland 317 n.a. 0.38 0.43 1.33 0.67 1.28 0.94 1.14 0.31 
Russia 132 n.a. 0.37 0.34 1.1 0.53 1.05 0.64 1.01 0.14 
South Africa 591 3463 0.45 0.47 1.35 0.59 0.97 1.02 1.29 0.27 
Thailand 487 796 0.34 0.27 1.1 0.63 0.73 0.81 1.06 0.24 
Turkey 207 2525 0.43 0.34 1.26 0.72 1.27 0.95 1.1 0.3 
Venezuela 23 5820 0.48 0.39 0.94 0.64 0.55 0.66 0.85 0.13 
Developed Countries                     
Australia 1,950 14291 0.76 0.62 1.36 0.69 0.85 1.05 1.5 0.44 
Austria 133 15946 0.41 0.33 1.03 0.58 1.12 0.73 0.97 0.28 
Belgium 175 15609 0.39 0.33 0.91 0.62 0.91 0.76 1.04 0.39 
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Canada 2,024 16751 0.6 0.57 1.57 0.75 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.3 
Czech Republic 52 n.a. 0.23 0.22 0.88 0.66 0.62 0.46 0.72 0.11 
Denmark 187 19716 0.37 0.35 1.12 0.58 0.91 0.75 1.05 0.3 
Finland 166 15576 0.26 0.27 0.72 0.55 0.85 0.62 0.91 0.21 
France 1,169 15982 0.31 0.31 0.88 0.58 0.84 0.77 1.02 0.3 
Germany 1,001 15656 0.4 0.42 1.22 0.68 1.06 1 1.29 0.32 
Greece 342 11079 0.34 0.32 1.07 0.58 1.15 0.86 1.11 0.36 
Hong Kong 894 11880 0.47 0.43 0.93 0.68 0.91 1.03 1.24 0.42 
Ireland 105 9957 0.44 0.52 1.39 0.59 0.67 1.09 1.24 0.36 
Israel 192 12603 0.34 0.34 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.75 1.06 0.23 
Italy 327 13094 0.36 0.3 0.93 0.54 0.76 0.7 0.9 0.3 
Japan 4,203 23982 0.19 0.19 0.44 0.57 0.64 0.46 0.63 0.16 
Netherlands 270 15936 0.29 0.32 1.07 0.52 0.85 0.76 1.1 0.28 
New Zealand 151 10265 0.4 0.44 1.4 0.52 0.84 0.74 1.5 0.4 
Norway 324 22301 0.55 0.46 1 0.73 0.8 0.77 1.2 0.41 
Portugal 103 6301 0.34 0.26 1 0.58 1.13 0.65 1.05 0.23 
Singapore 635 9043 0.37 0.3 0.78 0.63 0.89 0.85 1.09 0.26 
Spain 174 8826 0.32 0.25 0.94 0.56 0.94 0.81 0.99 0.24 
Sweden 533 19330 0.48 0.41 1.04 0.72 0.8 0.85 1.25 0.37 
Switzerland 260 28206 0.36 0.28 0.7 0.5 0.95 0.7 1.2 0.22 
United Kingdom 2,907 15575 0.46 0.48 1.39 0.62 0.83 0.99 1.28 0.32 
United States 11,392 22568 0.53 0.55 1.37 0.7 0.77 0.93 1.35 0.37 
 
This table reports average firm-level volatilities of total assets, cash, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  
Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the annual growth rate.  All firm characteristics are from the WorldScope database.  1980 Per Capita 
GDP is from the World Development Indicators Database.  Countries are classified by the World Bank's Atlas method.  Developed Country is defined as a high-
income economy and Developing Country is defined as a middle-income economy or lower. 
 
 
39 
 
Table 2 Panel B: Firm-Level Risk in Developed and Developing countries 
         
Firm-Level Risk 
Global 
Average 
Developed 
Country 
Average 
Developing 
Country 
Average 
Developed 
Minus 
Developing t-Stat 
Observations 
in Developed 
Countries 
Observations 
in 
Developing 
Countries 
Volatility of Sales Growth 0.419 0.432 0.388 0.044*** (6.65) 24272 9935 
Volatility of Assets Growth 0.41 0.436 0.347 0.089*** (16.58) 25847 10428 
Volatility of  Cash Holding Growth 1.107 1.113 1.092 0.021* (1.9) 25564 10187 
Volatility of  Profit Growth 0.624 0.639 0.593 0.046*** (6.4) 18813 8768 
Volatility of  Intangible Assets Growth 0.83 0.795 0.93 -0.136*** (12.1) 19574 6770 
Volatility of  Total Debts Growth 0.802 0.837 0.718 0.119*** (12.14) 22477 9232 
Volatility of  Short-Term Liabilities 1.107 1.162 0.97 0.192*** (16.34) 21685 8860 
Volatility of  Employment Growth 0.304 0.317 0.257 0.06*** (11.55) 23440 6870 
        This table compares firm-level volatilities in developed and developing countries.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the annual growth 
rate.  Total assets, cash, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment are from the WorldScope database.  Countries are 
classified by the World Bank's Atlas method.   Developed Country is defined as high-income economy and developing country is defined as middle-income 
economy or lower. Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics from univariate comparisons between developed and developing countries.  The *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 Panel C: Firm-Level Growth in Developed and Developing countries 
 
Firm-Level Growth 
Global 
Average 
Developed 
Country 
Average 
Developing 
Country 
Average 
Developed 
Minus 
Developing t-Stat 
Observations 
in 
Developed 
Countries 
Observations 
in 
Developing 
Countries 
Average Sales Growth 0.182 0.183 0.179 0.004 (0.73) 25564 10523 
Average Assets Growth 0.176 0.168 0.196 -0.028*** (6.6) 27083 10976 
Average Cash Holding Growth 0.143 0.124 0.189 -0.065*** (8.18) 26914 10785 
Average  Profit Growth 0.14 0.13 0.16 -0.029*** (4.78) 20570 9657 
Average Intangible Assets Growth 0.192 0.184 0.213 -0.029*** (3.26) 21470 7668 
Average Total Debts Growth 0.113 0.105 0.132 -0.027*** (3.51) 24336 10031 
Average Short-Term Liabilities 0.117 0.105 0.145 -0.039*** (4.4) 23672 9736 
Average Employment Growth 0.078 0.087 0.049 0.038*** (9.61) 25122 7756 
 
This table compares average firm-level growth rates in developed and developing countries.  Total assets, cash, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term 
liabilities, sales, profit, and employment are from the WorldScope database.  Countries are classified by the World Bank's Atlas method.   Developed Country is 
defined as a high-income economy and Developing Country is defined as a middle-income economy or lower. Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics 
from univariate comparisons between developed and developing countries.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Assets and Liabilities Structure 
 
       Size Cash/Total 
Assets 
Intangible 
/Total 
Assets 
Total 
Liabilities 
/Total 
Assets 
Short-
Term/Total 
Liabilities  
Short-Term 
Liabilities /Short-
Term Assets 
Developed Country Dummy 0.047 6.609 6.582 -1.874 -12.384 -12.183 
 (4.92)*** (83.11)*** (102.33)*** (13.93)*** (84.33)*** (32.69)*** 
Manufacturing  Dummy 0.484 -2.124 -2.316 0.308 3.875 -5.799 
 (64.16)*** (33.33)*** (44.01)*** (2.85)*** (32.49)*** (19.37)*** 
High-Tech Dummy -0.734 10.202 4.93 -4.24 0.116 -9.324 
 (79.07)*** (129.49)*** (75.17)*** (31.70)*** (0.76) (25.22)*** 
Size Quintile  -2.75 0.518 -0.162 -6.02 -7.01 
  (121.18)*** (27.63)*** (4.20)*** (139.24)*** (65.63)*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.1 0.02 
N 363059 361300 323084 351543 309943 347512 
       This table reports the coefficient estimates from the assets and liabilities structures regressions.  The dependent variables are the following firm characteristics - 
firm size (natural log of total assets), cash/total assets, intangible assets/total assets, total liabilities/total assets, short-term liabilities/total liabilities, and short-
term liabilities/current assets.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, Manufacturing Dummy, High-Tech Dummy, and Size Quintile. 
Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a middle-income 
economy or lower.  Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the 
firm is in the high-tech industry according to the American Electronic Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total 
assets.  Also estimated but not reported are a constant term and the year fixed-effects.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Firm-Level Volatilities 
 
Y= Firm-Level Volatility Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy 0.038 0.073 0.024 0.064 -0.149 0.096 0.161 0.043 
 (5.89)*** (14.50)*** (2.21)** (8.90)*** (13.29)*** (10.04)*** (13.67)*** (8.41)*** 
Manufacturing  Dummy -0.098 -0.12 -0.136 -0.034 -0.084 -0.155 -0.179 -0.072 
 (16.97)*** (26.22)*** (13.93)*** (5.05)*** (8.50)*** (17.80)*** (16.80)*** (16.82)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 0.064 0.1 -0.01 0.05 0.113 0.211 0.169 0.02 
 (9.17)*** (18.23)*** (0.82) (5.83)*** (9.69)*** (19.71)*** (12.83)*** (3.98)*** 
Size Quintile -0.118 -0.115 -0.241 -0.076 -0.06 -0.134 -0.072 -0.055 
 (52.41)*** (65.43)*** (64.42)*** (27.84)*** (15.61)*** (39.87)*** (17.46)*** (33.12)*** 
R-squared 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.05 
N 34207 36275 35751 27581 26344 31709 30545 30310 
         This table reports the coefficient estimates from the firm-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, intangible 
assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the firm’s annual growth 
rate.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, Manufacturing Dummy, High-Tech Dummy, and Size Quintile. Developed Country Dummy 
takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  
Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-
tech industry according to the American Electronic Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total assets.  Also estimated 
but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Dispersions 
 
       Y= Within Country 
Dispersions across Firms 
Dispersion 
of Sales 
Growth  
Dispersion 
of  Asset 
Growth  
Dispersion 
of  Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Dispersion 
of  Profit 
Growth 
Dispersion 
of  
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Dispersion 
of  Total 
Debt 
Growth 
Dispersion 
of Short-
term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Dispersion of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy 0.317 0.256 0.244 0.233 0.04 0.368 0.46 0.04 
 (4.65)*** (4.09)*** (3.32)*** (3.31)*** (0.50) (4.75)*** (5.34)*** (0.47) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.24 0.27 0.11 0.23 0.1 0.2 0.18 0.11 
N 684 679 602 591 620 605 582 578 
         This table reports the coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional dispersion regressions.  The dependent variables are the cross-sectional dispersion of total 
assets, cash, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Cross-sectional dispersion is defined as the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the firm growth rate calculated across all firms within a country.  The explanatory variable is Developed Country Dummy.  Developed 
Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a middle-income economy or 
lower.  Also estimated but not reported are a constant term and the year fixed-effects.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Panel A: Sector-Level Volatilities 
 
       Y= Sector-Level Volatility  Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy -0.056 -0.051 -0.146 -0.086 -0.162 -0.091 -0.07 -0.01 
 (4.49)*** (5.51)*** (5.29)*** (4.24)*** (4.29)*** (2.36)** (1.59) (0.70) 
Manufacturing Fraction -0.057 -0.053 -0.008 -0.007 -0.032 -0.036 0.033 -0.026 
 (3.57)*** (4.45)*** (0.22) (0.25) (0.67) (0.72) (0.58) (1.49) 
High-Tech Fraction 0.027 0.064 -0.036 -0.126 -0.175 -0.003 -0.082 -0.013 
 (0.84) (2.70)*** (0.51) (2.40)** (1.84)* (0.04) (0.73) (0.38) 
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 
N 629 631 631 627 612 629 629 612 
         
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the sector-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, intangible 
assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the sector-level annual 
growth rate.  Sector classification is based on 17 Fama-French industries.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, Manufacturing Fraction, 
and High-Tech Fraction.  Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is 
classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  Manufacturing Dummy is the fraction of manufacturing firms in that sector.  High-Tech is the fraction of high-
tech firms in that sector according to the American Electronic Association.  Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the parentheses are 
the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Panel B: Country-Level Volatilities 
 
       Y= Country-Level Volatility  Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy -0.085 -0.083 -0.1 -0.107 -0.294 -0.15 -0.158 -0.008 
 (3.75)*** (3.29)*** (4.26)*** (4.12)*** (2.49)** (2.93)*** (2.66)** (0.96) 
R-squared 0.24 0.2 0.29 0.28 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.02 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
         This table reports the coefficient estimates from the country-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, 
intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the country-
level annual growth rate.  Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is 
classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Panel A: Foreign Entry and Volatilities 
 
   Y= Firm-Level Volatility Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy 0.07 0.095 0.015 0.078 -0.117 0.069 0.061 0.014 
 (9.95)*** (17.53)*** (1.32) (8.48)*** (8.26)*** (5.83)*** (4.12)*** (2.39)** 
Manufacturing Dummy -0.08 -0.089 -0.067 -0.018 -0.098 -0.14 -0.146 -0.061 
 (11.91)*** (17.03)*** (5.99)*** (2.00)** (7.57)*** (12.16)*** (10.35)*** (11.37)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 0.015 0.036 0.005 0.02 0.074 0.195 0.158 0.013 
 (1.82)* (5.53)*** (0.33) (1.74)* (4.73)*** (13.30)*** (8.79)*** (1.90)* 
Size Quintile -0.078 -0.078 -0.141 -0.058 -0.058 -0.109 -0.057 -0.031 
 (29.64)*** (39.05)*** (32.42)*** (16.24)*** (11.26)*** (24.01)*** (10.04)*** (14.62)*** 
Incoming Mergers/ All Mergers  0.086 0.078 0.161 -0.063 0.124 0.129 0.171 0.046 
 (7.93)*** (9.28)*** (8.93)*** (4.46)*** (5.78)*** (6.96)*** (7.54)*** (5.02)*** 
Initial Volatility 0.556 0.54 0.565 0.349 0.191 0.387 0.423 0.266 
 (24.53)*** (20.32)*** (38.74)*** (15.30)*** (10.72)*** (18.04)*** (22.10)*** (12.61)*** 
R-squared 0.1 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.04 
N 20149 21242 20975 17293 15943 18464 17874 16355 
         
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the firm-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, intangible 
assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the firm annual growth 
rate.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, Manufacturing Dummy, High-Tech Dummy, Size Quintile and Incoming Mergers/All Mergers. 
Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a middle-income 
economy or lower.  Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the 
firm is in the high-tech industry according to the American Electronic Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total 
assets.  Incoming Mergers/All Mergers is the sector-level aggregate inward cross-border M&As scaled by all (domestic and inward foreign) M&As from SDC. 
Sector classification is based on 17 Fama-French industries.  To avoid reverse causality, the measure of foreign entry is computed from 1989-1998 data while the 
firm-level volatilities are computed from the non-overlapping period of 1999-2008 (as opposed to the full 1989-2008 sample in other specifications).  Initial 
volatilities are the sector average of firm-level volatilities computed from 1989-1998 data.  Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the 
parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Panel B: Foreign Outflow and Volatilities 
 
Y= Firm-Level Volatility Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy 0.057 0.088 -0.03 0.079 -0.139 0.042 0.033 0 
 (7.52)*** (15.09)*** (2.43)** (7.94)*** (9.22)*** (3.30)*** (2.06)** (0.08) 
Manufacturing Dummy -0.071 -0.079 -0.059 -0.028 -0.086 -0.133 -0.132 -0.06 
 (10.38)*** (14.67)*** (5.21)*** (3.08)*** (6.56)*** (11.26)*** (9.17)*** (10.82)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 0.016 0.039 0.006 0.015 0.08 0.201 0.167 0.014 
 (1.88)* (6.00)*** (0.46) (1.32) (5.12)*** (13.65)*** (9.27)*** (2.08)** 
Size Quintile -0.08 -0.079 -0.144 -0.059 -0.06 -0.112 -0.058 -0.032 
 (29.87)*** (38.94)*** (32.74)*** (16.31)*** (11.74)*** (24.31)*** (10.19)*** (14.83)*** 
Outgoing Mergers/ All Mergers  0.002 -0.02 0.096 0.042 0.037 0.043 0.026 0.028 
 (0.16) (1.91)* (4.35)*** (2.44)** (1.44) (1.91)* (0.93) (2.69)*** 
Initial Volatility 0.567 0.544 0.592 0.348 0.206 0.389 0.442 0.294 
 (24.80)*** (20.27)*** (39.74)*** (15.07)*** (11.68)*** (18.07)*** (23.03)*** (14.30)*** 
R-squared 0.1 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.04 
N 19971 21063 20796 17138 15854 18297 17711 16247 
         This table reports the coefficient estimates from the firm-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, intangible 
assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the firm annual growth 
rate.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, Manufacturing Dummy, High-Tech Dummy, Size Quintile, and Outgoing Mergers/All Mergers. 
Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a middle-income 
economy or lower.  Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the 
firm is in the high-tech industry according to the American Electronic Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total 
assets.  Outgoing Mergers/All Mergers is the sector-level aggregate outward cross-border M&As scaled by all (domestic and outward foreign) M&As from SDC. 
Sector classification is based on 17 Fama-French industries.  To avoid reverse causality, the measure of foreign entry is computed from 1989-1998 data while the 
firm-level volatilities are computed from the non-overlapping period of 1999-2008 (as opposed to the full 1989-2008 sample in other specifications).   Initial 
volatilities are the sector average of firm-level volatilities computed from 1989-1998 data.  Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the 
parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Panel A: Technology and Volatilities 
 
      Y= Firm-Level Volatility Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy 0.041 0.074 0.029 0.056 -0.168 0.101 0.171 0.049 
 (5.88)*** (13.36)*** (2.45)** (7.17)*** (13.38)*** (9.61)*** (13.26)*** (8.83)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 0.013 0.023 -0.084 -0.009 -0.003 0.116 0.074 -0.004 
 (0.92) (1.94)* (3.42)*** (0.54) (0.11) (5.22)*** (2.70)*** (0.33) 
Developed Country Dummy 
x High Tech 
0.056 0.085 0.078 0.077 0.142 0.106 0.104 0.021 
 (3.42)*** (6.42)*** (2.81)*** (4.04)*** (5.16)*** (4.18)*** (3.34)*** (1.56) 
Size Quintile -0.121 -0.119 -0.246 -0.076 -0.062 -0.138 -0.077 -0.057 
 (53.68)*** (68.00)*** (66.13)*** (28.06)*** (16.36)*** (41.05)*** (18.62)*** (34.70)*** 
R-squared 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.04 
N 34207 36275 35751 27581 26344 31709 30545 30310 
         
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the firm-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, intangible 
assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the firm annual growth 
rate.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, High-Tech Dummy, the interaction term between Developed Country Dummy and High-Tech 
Dummy, as well as Size Quintile. Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the 
country is classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry according to the American 
Electronic Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total assets.  Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  
Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Panel B: External Finance Dependency and Volatilities 
 
     Y= Firm-Level Volatility Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy -0.01 0.029 0.047 0.011 -0.227 0.027 0.104 0.036 
 (0.73) (2.56)** (1.89)* (0.65) (8.60)*** (1.19) (3.74)*** (3.14)*** 
External Dependency 0.066 0.071 -0.134 -0.017 -0.031 0.138 0.082 0.017 
 (2.92)*** (3.98)*** (3.40)*** (0.62) (0.76) (3.77)*** (1.82)* (0.87) 
Developed Country Dummy 
x External Dependency 
0.159 0.155 0.078 0.188 0.181 0.254 0.228 0.037 
 (5.86)*** (7.26)*** (1.65)* (5.60)*** (3.70)*** (5.76)*** (4.23)*** (1.67)* 
Size Quintile -0.101 -0.096 -0.248 -0.067 -0.048 -0.124 -0.083 -0.048 
 (35.01)*** (42.68)*** (49.90)*** (17.85)*** (9.38)*** (26.80)*** (14.61)*** (22.20)*** 
R-squared 0.1 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 
N 17628 18133 17953 14509 13783 16412 15985 15407 
         
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the firm-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, 
intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the firm 
annual growth rate.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, External Finance Dependency Indicator, the interaction term between 
Developed Country Dummy and External Finance Dependency Indicator, as well as Size Quintile. Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if 
the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  External Finance 
Dependency Indicator is from Rajan and Zingales (1998).  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total assets.  Also estimated 
but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Panel C: Small-Firm Dominance and Volatilities 
 
Y= Firm-Level Volatility Volatility of 
Sales 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Asset 
Growth  
Volatility of 
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Profit 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Volatility of 
Employment 
Growth 
Developed Country Dummy 0.146 0.185 0.108 0.119 -0.086 0.263 0.305 0.073 
 (9.48)*** (15.11)*** (4.03)*** (6.33)*** (3.03)*** (10.50)*** (10.03)*** (5.87)*** 
Small Firm Industry -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.85) (1.00) (0.18) (0.48) (0.39) (1.30) (1.62) (0.93) 
Developed Country Dummy 
x Small Firm Industry 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.014 -0.012 -0.003 
 (4.83)*** (6.12)*** (1.55) (1.14) (1.99)** (4.10)*** (2.89)*** (1.49) 
Size Quintile -0.11 -0.105 -0.243 -0.072 -0.054 -0.141 -0.096 -0.05 
 (39.23)*** (48.00)*** (50.52)*** (19.44)*** (10.84)*** (31.05)*** (17.31)*** (23.97)*** 
R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.04 
N 17628 18133 17953 14509 13783 16412 15985 15407 
         This table reports the coefficient estimates from the firm-level volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are the volatilities of total assets, cash, intangible 
assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, sales, profit, and employment.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the firm annual growth 
rate.  The explanatory variables are Developed Country Dummy, Small Firm Industry Indicator, the interaction term between Developed Country Dummy and 
Small Firm Industry Indicator, as well as Size Quintile. Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy 
and zero if the country is classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  Small Firm Industry Indicator is from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 
(2008).  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total assets.  Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the 
parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Panel D: Rivalry among Industry Leaders 
Y= Volatilities of 
Industry Leader's 
Market Share 
Market Share among the Top 2 Firms Market Share among the Top 5 Firms 
Technological 
Intensity 
External 
Dependency 
Small Firm 
Dominance 
Technological 
Intensity 
External 
Dependency 
Small Firm 
Dominance 
Developed Country 
Dummy 
0.506 -0.045 0.477 0.496 0.002 0.56 
 
(11.15)*** (0.50) (4.48)*** (11.49)*** (0.02) (5.55)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 1.18 
  
1.16 
  
 
(8.74)*** 
  
(9.03)*** 
  
Developed Country 
Dummy x High Tech 
0.399 
  
0.419 
  
 
(2.58)*** 
  
(2.85)*** 
  
External Dependency 
 
0.723 
  
0.704 
 
 
 
(3.91)*** 
  
(4.02)*** 
 
Developed Country 
Dummy x External 
Dependency 
 
0.687 
  
0.584 
 
  
(3.20)*** 
  
(2.87)*** 
 
Small Firm Industry 
  
0.012 
  
0.026 
   
(0.98) 
  
(2.29)** 
Developed Country 
Dummy x Small Firm 
Industry 
  
-0.032 
  
-0.043 
   
(2.29)** 
  
(3.33)*** 
Year 0.108 0.09 0.093 0.106 0.088 0.091 
 
(25.71)*** (17.18)*** (17.79)*** (26.48)*** (17.71)*** (18.28)*** 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
N 67615 38638 38638 67615 38638 38638 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the market share volatility regressions.  The dependent variables are 
the volatilities of industry leader’s market share.  In each year, we identify the largest two (five) firms in each four-
digit SIC industry in each country.  We track the size of these two (five) firms over the next five years.  Then, we 
compute the volatilities of market share of the largest firms.  Volatility is defined as the time-series standard 
deviation of the market share.  The first three columns report the results from the top two firms’ market shares.  The 
last three columns report the results from the top five firms’ market shares.  The explanatory variables are developed 
country dummy, industry indicators (high-tech, external finance, and small firm industries), the interactions between 
developed country dummy and industry indicators and Year.   High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-
tech industry according to the American Electronic Association.  External Finance Dependency Indicator is from 
Rajan and Zingales (1998).  Small Firm Industry Indicator is from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 
(2008).   Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Reactions to Productivity Shocks  
 
Shock =Growth in Value Added Sales 
Growth  
Asset 
Growth  
Cash 
Holding 
Growth 
Profit 
Growth 
Intangible 
Assets 
Growth 
Total Debt 
Growth 
Short-term 
Liabilities 
Growth 
Employment 
Growth 
Shock 0.124 0.09 0.128 0.216 0.094 0.056 0.081 0.06 
 (8.42)*** (6.77)*** (3.89)*** (8.81)*** (2.40)** (2.00)** (2.10)** (4.33)*** 
Shock x Developed Country Dummy 0.141 0.15 0.255 0.254 0.15 0.108 0.077 -0.007 
 (7.33)*** (8.69)*** (5.92)*** (7.78)*** (3.15)*** (2.90)*** (1.52) (0.42) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.22 
N 102402 105775 103403 72911 76752 88967 85296 88013 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the reactions-to-productivity-shocks regressions.  The dependent variables are the growth rate of sales, total 
assets, cash, profit, intangible assets, total liabilities, short-term liabilities, and employment.  The explanatory variables are Productivity Shocks and the 
interaction between Productivity Shocks and Developed Country dummy.  Productivity Shock is the percentage change in value added from the UNIDO 
Database.  Developed Country Dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a 
middle-income economy or lower.  Also estimated but not reported are the firm-fixed effects.   Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: Difference-in-Difference Analysis for Cash Holdings 
 
Y= Cash/Total Assets 
Technological 
Intensity 
External 
Dependency 
Small Firm 
Dominance 
Foreign 
Inflows 
Foreign 
Outflows 
Developed Country Dummy 6.013 -0.317 13.807 5.88 5.966 
 
(70.43)*** (1.82)* (68.45)*** (60.81)*** (57.63)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 4.564 
  
7.206 7.208 
 
(23.24)*** 
  
(61.60)*** (61.54)*** 
Developed Country Dummy x High 
Tech 
6.39 
    
 
(29.90)*** 
    
External Dependency 
 
6.245 
   
 
 
(20.10)*** 
   
Developed Country Dummy x 
External Dependency  
16.66 
   
  
(47.27)*** 
   
Small Firm Industry 
  
-0.053 
  
   
(2.21)** 
  
Developed Country Dummy x 
Small Firm Industry   
-0.733 
  
   
(26.40)*** 
  
Incoming Mergers/ All Mergers  
   
0.179 
 
    
(1.18) 
 
Outgoing Mergers/ All Mergers  
    
-0.604 
     
(3.33)*** 
Manufacturing Dummy 
   
-3.945 -3.782 
    
(42.90)*** (40.04)*** 
Size Quintile -2.797 -1.784 -2.633 -2.913 -2.926 
 
(123.70)*** (57.31)*** (83.58)*** (87.13)*** (86.62)*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.12 
N 361300 188503 188503 151521 150386 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the cash holding regressions.  The dependent variable is Cash/Total 
Assets.  Developed Country dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and 
zero if the country is classified as a middle-income economy or lower.   Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the 
firm is in the manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-
tech industry according to the American Electronic Association.  External Finance Dependency Indicator is from 
Rajan and Zingales (1998).  Small Firm Industry Indicator is from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 
(2008).  Incoming Mergers/All Mergers is the sector-level aggregate inward cross-border M&As scaled by all 
(domestic and inward foreign) M&As. Outgoing Mergers/All Mergers is the sector-level aggregate outward cross-
border M&As scaled by all (domestic and outward foreign) M&As. Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-
country distribution of total assets.  To avoid reverse causality, the measure of foreign entry is computed from 1989-
1998 data while Cash/Total Assets in the last two columns are restricted to the non-overlapping period of 1999-2008 
(as opposed to the full 1989-2008 sample in other specifications).   Also estimated but not reported are a constant 
term and the year fixed-effects.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table11 Panel A: Institution and Cash Holding 
               
Y=Cash/Total Assets; 
Institution= 
Ease of 
Doing 
Business 
Rank 
Judiciary 
Efficiency 
 
Rule of Law 
 
Corruption 
 
Accounting 
Standard 
 
Log of Per 
Capita GDP 
in 1980 
Stock Market 
Capitalization/ 
GDP in 1980 
 
Investment-Q 
Sensitivity 
Share Issue-Q 
Sensitivity 
Debt Issue -Q 
Sensitivity 
Institution -0.068 1.697 1.715 1.624 0.122 1.87 4.466 27.771 10.305 9.32 
 
(72.05)*** (84.58)*** (91.99)*** (72.06)*** (38.18)*** (76.60)*** (35.07)*** (40.30)*** (50.92)*** (56.08)*** 
Manufacturing 
Dummy 
-2.324 -2.379 -2.143 -2.217 -2.663 -2.064 -2.609 -2.512 -2.358 -2.366 
 (36.43)*** (36.19)*** (32.54)*** (33.43)*** (40.16)*** (31.37)*** (38.01)*** (37.66)*** (35.31)*** (35.56)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 10.267 10.433 10.258 10.679 10.955 10.445 11.082 10.95 10.772 10.727 
 
(129.76)*** 
(127.92)**
* 
(125.78)*** 
(130.86)**
* 
(133.64)**
* 
(128.35)*** (131.06)*** (133.64)*** (131.34)*** (130.88)*** 
Size Quintile -2.69 -2.81 -2.826 -2.777 -2.703 -2.828 -2.788 -2.6 -2.567 -2.6 
 
(118.16)*** 
(120.54)**
* 
(121.43)*** 
(118.82)**
* 
(114.85)**
* 
(121.11)*** (114.80)*** (109.24)*** (108.09)*** (110.19)*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
N 360629 342967 342967 342967 342967 347161 324074 342967 342967 342967 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the cash holding regressions.  The dependent variable is Cash/Total Assets. The explanatory variables are 
Institutional Indicator, Manufacturing Dummy, High-Tech Dummy, and Size Quintile.  Institutional Indicators are Ease of Doing Business Rank from the World 
Bank's doing business indicator, Judiciary Efficiency, Rule of Law, Corruption, Accounting Standard from La Porta et. al (1998), 1980 Log of Per Capita GDP 
from World Development Indicator Database, 1980 Stock Market Capitalization per GDP from Rajan and Zingales (1998), investment sensitivity, share issue 
sensitivity, and debt issue sensitivity to Tobin’s Q from McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012).   Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the 
manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry according to the American Electronic 
Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total assets.  Also estimated but not reported are a constant term and the year 
fixed-effects.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 11 Panel B: Institution and Firm- Level Risk 
                
Y=Volatility of 
Sales Growth; 
Institution= 
Ease of Doing 
Business Rank 
Judiciary 
Efficiency 
 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Corruption 
 
 
Accounting 
Standard 
 
Log of Per 
Capita 
GDP in 
1980 
Stock Market 
Capitalization
/ GDP in 
1980 
 
Investment-Q 
Sensitivity 
Share Issue-Q 
Sensitivity 
Debt Issue -Q 
Sensitivity 
Institution -0.001 0.014 0.03 0.025 0.004 0.027 0.115 1.982 0.571 0.427 
 
(15.53)*** (7.71)*** (19.06)*** (12.96)*** (12.35)*** (13.37)*** (10.42)*** (32.17)*** (31.35)*** (28.84)*** 
Manufacturing 
Dummy 
-0.09 -0.099 -0.086 -0.091 -0.096 -0.089 -0.097 -0.076 -0.073 -0.078 
 (15.41)*** (16.22)*** (14.16)*** (14.79)*** (15.88)*** (14.74)*** (15.40)*** (12.53)*** (12.11)*** (12.90)*** 
High-Tech 
Dummy 
0.056 0.063 0.052 0.061 0.063 0.058 0.064 0.052 0.047 0.048 
 (8.08)*** (8.68)*** (7.12)*** (8.36)*** (8.67)*** (8.03)*** (8.51)*** (7.23)*** (6.58)*** (6.68)*** 
Size Quintile -0.118 -0.119 -0.122 -0.12 -0.117 -0.123 -0.12 -0.111 -0.112 -0.115 
 (52.55)*** (50.94)*** (52.27)*** (51.42)*** (50.22)*** (52.65)*** (49.74)*** (48.20)*** (48.31)*** (49.62)*** 
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.12 0.12 
N 34120 31984 31984 31984 31984 32594 30221 31984 31984 31984 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the volatility regressions.  The dependent variable is the volatilities of sales growth. The explanatory variables 
are Institutional Indicator, Manufacturing Dummy, High-Tech Dummy, and Size Quintile.  Institutional Indicators are Ease of Doing Business Rank from the 
World Bank's doing business indicator, Judiciary Efficiency, Rule of Law, Corruption, Accounting Standard from La Porta et. al (1998), 1980 Log of Per Capita 
GDP from World Development Indicator Database, 1980 Stock Market Capitalization per GDP from Rajan and Zingales (1998), investment sensitivity, share 
issue sensitivity, and debt issue sensitivity to Tobin’s Q from McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012).  Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the 
manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry according to the American Electronic 
Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total assets.  Also estimated but not reported is a constant term.  Numbers in the 
parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 Panel A: Cash Holding and Volatilities 
 
    
Y=Cash/Total Assets Sample = U.S. Firms Only Sample = All Countries 
Non-Overlapping 
Sample 
Country-Level Aggregate Sales 
Volatility 
    -3.989       
   
(4.81)*** 
   
Sector-Level Aggregate Sales 
Volatility 
5.633 
  
-2.182 
  
 
(2.07)** 
  
(5.69)*** 
  
Firm-Level Sales Volatility 
 
29.169 
  
10.101 9.83 
  
(45.28)*** 
  
(56.04)*** (30.88)*** 
Developed Country Dummy 
  
6.236 6.399 5.97 7.45 
   
(56.19)*** (73.03)*** (74.64)*** (76.27)*** 
Manufacturing Dummy -0.744 1.164 -2.124 -2.147 -1.322 -2.198 
 
(5.02)*** (7.69)*** (33.34)*** (33.63)*** (20.32)*** (26.15)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 13.271 10.742 10.168 10.159 9.587 10.076 
 
(83.61)*** (64.51)*** (128.55)*** (128.37)*** (121.03)*** (102.05)*** 
Size Quintile -3.924 -3.644 -2.744 -2.755 -2.468 -3.13 
 
(81.90)*** (76.17)*** (120.81)*** (121.31)*** (106.65)*** (107.25)*** 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 
N 103351 103351 361300 361268 361268 244090 
       This table reports the coefficient estimates from the cash holding regressions.  The dependent variable is Cash/Total 
Assets.  Country-level volatility is defined as the standard deviation of average sales growth in one country.  Sector-
level volatility is defined as the standard deviation of average sales growth in one sector.  Firm-level volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of firm-level sales growth.  To alleviate the endogeneity problem, firm-level 
volatilities were averaged across all firms in their sector before they are included in the regressions.  Developed 
Country dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country 
is classified as a middle-income economy or lower.  Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the 
manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry 
according to the American Electronic Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution 
of total assets.  In the last column, the measure of firm-level volatility is computed from 1989-1998 data while 
Cash/Total Assets are restricted to the non-overlapping period of 1999-2008 (as opposed to the full 1989-2008 
sample in other specifications).   Also estimated but not reported are a constant term and the year fixed-effects.  
Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 Panel B: Cash Holding, Volatilities, and Firm Characteristics 
 
  
Y=Cash/Total Assets               
Firm-Level Sales Volatility 10.101 8.618 8.567 12.292 13.945 15.188 12.625 
 
(56.04)*** (46.50)*** (45.28)*** (61.05)*** (55.63)*** (37.81)*** (32.62)*** 
Developed Country Dummy 5.97 5.16 5.588 4.876 4.94 3.747 2.751 
 
(74.64)*** (62.86)*** (64.06)*** (54.75)*** (46.18)*** (19.65)*** (14.91)*** 
Manufacturing Dummy -1.322 -1.26 -1.174 -1.264 -0.952 -2.443 -1.73 
 (20.32)*** (18.98)*** (17.24)*** (17.80)*** (11.39)*** (18.89)*** (13.79)*** 
High-Tech Dummy 9.587 9.421 9.648 9.601 10.227 7.367 6.921 
 
(121.03)*** (115.37)*** (115.14)*** (111.59)*** (103.32)*** (53.31)*** (51.38)*** 
Size Quintile -2.468 -2.294 -2.268 -2.304 -2.314 -1.709 -0.958 
 
(106.65)*** (96.02)*** (91.50)*** (90.57)*** (79.02)*** (37.54)*** (21.26)*** 
Lagged Leverage 
 
-0.1 -0.099 -0.096 -0.089 -0.115 -0.146 
  
(94.33)*** (91.20)*** (86.60)*** (72.95)*** (65.41)*** (79.47)*** 
Lagged Dividend Dummy 
  
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   
(15.78)*** (14.47)*** (13.94)*** (13.25)*** (13.64)*** 
Lagged Capital 
Expenditure/Total Assets    
-0.234 -0.253 -0.343 -0.396 
    
(51.37)*** (47.85)*** (38.77)*** (43.80)*** 
Lagged Acquisitions/Total 
Assets     
-0.352 -0.392 -0.348 
     
(45.93)*** (33.15)*** (30.56)*** 
Lagged R&D/Total Assets 
     
0.387 0.318 
      
(86.39)*** (66.56)*** 
Lagged Tobin's Q/Total 
Assets       
0.893 
       
(57.85)*** 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.31 
N 361268 312189 298090 279656 216918 104175 94624 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the cash holding regressions.  The dependent variable is Cash/Total Assets.  
Firm-level volatility is defined as the standard deviation of firm-level sales growth.  To alleviate the endogeneity problem, firm-
level volatilities were averaged across all firms in their sector before they are included in the regressions.  Developed Country 
dummy takes the value of one if the country is classified as a high-income economy and zero if the country is classified as a 
middle-income economy or lower.  Manufacturing Dummy is equal to one if the firm is in the manufacturing industries (SIC 
codes 2000-3999).  High-Tech is equal to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry according to the American Electronic 
Association.  Size Quintile is constructed from the cross-country distribution of total assets. Leverage, Dividend Dummy, Capital 
Expenditure/Total Assets, Acquisitions/Total Assets, R&D/Total Assets, and Tobin’s Q are from the WorldScope.  Also 
estimated but not reported are a constant term and the year fixed-effects.  Numbers in the parentheses are the t statistics.  The *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Internet Appendix 
Internet Appendix A: Robustness Tests 
In this appendix, we summarize the results from additional robustness checks.  The sections in the appendix 
correspond to the sections in the main article where the robustness checks belong.     
  
4.  Asset and Liability Structures 
Alternative Specifications 
We examine several variations of the asset and liability structure regressions in Table 3.  To fully control for 
industry effects, we replace manufacturing and high tech dummies with two-digit SIC industry fixed effects.  To 
check whether our country dummy captures the degree of economic and institutional development, we use per capita 
GDP in 1980 instead of a developed country dummy.  Our findings hold in all these robustness checks. 
 
Sample Selection 
Our main sample covers all countries in WorldScope with a large number of observations.  We further add smaller 
countries such as Egypt and Lithuania to our sample to ensure diverse geographical representation.  To verify that 
our results are not sample specific, we estimate the assets and liabilities structure regressions in Table 3 using 
alternative country samples: (1) the entire WorldScope and (2) all the countries in WorldScope with greater than 
1,000 firm-year observations.  We still find that firms in developed countries have more conservative financial 
policies (more cash, lower leverage, and fewer short-term debts).   The coefficients on other explanatory variables 
barely change.  The only major difference between the main and alternative samples is that in the alternative 
samples, average firms in developed countries are smaller than average firms in developing countries.  The size 
result is the opposite in our main sample where countries with small number of observations are excluded.   For the 
time period, our main samples cover the data from 1989 to 2008 so a concern is whether our results change after the 
2008 global financial crisis.  We estimate the regressions in Table 3 using the data from 2009 to 2012.  The result 
that firms in developed countries have more conservative financial policies still holds. 
 
Controls for Size and Age 
In addition to Total Assets, we also use market capitalization as an alternative proxy for firm size.  Market 
capitalization is computed from the number of shares outstanding x year-end equity price in U.S. dollars.  The size 
quintile constructed from market capitalization is highly correlated with our original measure constructed from total 
assets.  All existing results still hold.  
 
One might be concerned that size quintile is not an adequate control for firm size.  To address these issues, we 
replace size quintile with the exact firm size (natural log of total assets), the size relative to other firms in its country 
(the firm’s total assets scaled by its country’s average total assets) and the size relative to other firms in its local 
sector (the firm’s total assets scaled by its local sector’s average total assets) where a local sector is defined as one of 
the 17 Fama-French industries in the firm’s country.  Our main results hold for alternative measures– developed 
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country firms hold more cash, have more intangible assets, have lower leverage, and fewer short-term debts.  Large 
firms have less cash, more intangible assets, and less short-term debts.  Studying firms in different countries 
conditioned on relative size also mitigates the concern that WorldScope might not capture the majority of firms in 
developing countries and that we only compare the largest firms in developing countries with average firms in 
developed countries. 
 
To address the concern that observations in developed and developing countries are not comparable because firms in 
different countries decide to go public at different stages in their life cycles, we control for firm age.  We define firm 
age as current year less incorporation year.   A caveat is that WorldScope data on firm’s age is very limited – fewer 
than half of our observations have data on firm age.  The existing results still hold.  Developed country firms hold 
more cash, have more intangible assets, have lower leverage, and have fewer short-term debts.  Firms in developing 
countries are generally older than firms in developed countries.  Age is highly correlated with size, and most effects 
of age on financial structures are similar to size.  Like larger firms, older firms have less cash, lower leverage, and 
fewer short-term debts.  The only difference is intangible assets – larger firms have more intangible assets but older 
firms have less.   
 
Standard Errors 
First, we compute heteroscedasticity robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimators.  In addition 
to robust standard errors, we estimate the standard errors with clusters on country and industry where each industry 
is defined as a two-digit SIC group.  We also cluster standard errors by firm.  All the main results are still 
statistically significant.    
 
5.  Firm-Level Risk 
5.1 Volatility  
Alternative Specifications 
We examine a number of variations of the firm-level volatility regressions in Table 4.  As alternative controls for 
industry effects, we replace manufacturing and high-tech dummies with two-digit SIC industry fixed effects.  To 
check whether our country dummy captures the degree of economic and institutional development, we use per capita 
GDP in 1980 instead of a developed country dummy.  One might be concerned that firms with high average growth 
rates will automatically have high volatilities.  So, we scale volatilities by means before running the regressions.  To 
address the concern that the annual data we use to compute volatilities are less complete in certain countries, for 
each firm we count the number of years in which the data are available and explicitly control for them in the 
regressions.  Our findings remain strong in all of these robustness checks. 
 
Quality of WorldScope Data 
A concern is that the quality of financial statement information may vary across countries.  However, we study 
volatilities of growth rates.  So, any fixed discrepancies in accounting standards have already been differenced away.  
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Yet another concern is that fundamentals of firms in emerging markets are in fact very volatile but their financial 
statements do not reflect the true fundamentals.   For example, the accounting literature suggests that firms may 
deliberately manipulate their earnings so that the numbers are stable instead of having years with exceptionally good 
or bad earnings.  To alleviate this concern, we study volatilities of eight different variables including sales and 
employment which are more difficult to manipulate.  Furthermore, we try subtracting increase in accounts receivable 
from sales growth to eliminate the possibility of credit sales manipulation.  We still find that firms in developed 
countries are more volatile.  
 
The survival rates of firms in WorldScope (measured by the likelihood that a firm with financial statement 
information in year t will exist in WorldScope in year t+i) differ across countries.  We find that firms in developed 
countries have lower survival rates for all i in {1,2,3,4,5}.  This is consistent with our main findings that firms in 
developed countries are riskier.  
 
Sample Selection 
To ensure that our risk results are not sample specific, we estimate the regressions in Tables 4-6 using alternative 
country samples: (1) the entire WorldScope and (2) all the countries in WorldScope with greater than 100 firms.  We 
confirm that firm-level volatilities and cross-sectional dispersions are higher in developed countries.  For country-
level volatilities, we confirm that aggregate volatilities are higher in developing countries.  The major difference 
between the main and alternative samples is in Table 6 Panel A: Sector-Level Volatilities.  In the main sample, 
sector-level volatilities are higher in developing countries.  In alternative samples, sector-level volatilities are higher 
in developed countries.  This difference is likely to be driven by the fact that, in alternative samples which contain 
many countries with small number of firms, sector-level volatilities are closer proxies of firm-level volatilities, 
rather than aggregate volatilities.  To ensure that our results are not just driven by firms from some large developed 
countries, we exclude countries with the most observations such as the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Canada.  For the time 
period, our main samples cover the data from 1988 to 2008.  We compute alternative measures of volatilities using 
the data up to 2012 and the main results still hold.  We also compute cross-sectional dispersions each year from 
2009 to 2012.  We still find that cross-sectional dispersions are higher in developed countries. 
 
Given that we find greater firm-level risk in developed countries, a concern is whether we underestimate the 
downside risk (distributional asymmetry arising from financial crises) in developing countries.  An advantage of our 
main sample period (1988-2008) is that it covers multiple crisis episodes in the emerging world, including the 1994 
Tequila crisis, 1997 Asian crisis, 1998 Russian crisis, 1999 Argentine Crisis, and 2000 Turkish Crisis. 
 
Controls for Exchange Rate Volatilities       
We use firm characteristics from WorldScope that are denominated in U.S. dollars.  Intuitively, it is unlikely that our 
results are driven by exchange rate volatilities; we find that firms in developed countries are more volatile despite 
the fact that exchange rate volatilities tend to be higher in developing countries.  To formally address this concern, 
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we compute firm-level risk in local currencies.  We define growth rate in local currency as G i,t + ln(e c,t) – ln(e c,t-1) 
where G i,t is firm growth rate in USD.  e c,t is the exchange rate in local currency/USD and ln(e c,t) – ln(e c,t-1) is 
percentage depreciation of local currency.  Our exchange rate is the annual average of daily exchange rates from 
Bloomberg.  During the sample period, a number of countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and the Eurozone 
countries switched their currencies.  Since new currencies are sometimes introduced because of high inflation, we 
use depreciation rate of the old currency for the transition year to capture large revaluation.    
 
Our existing results still hold.  Volatilities in local currencies are higher in developed countries.  Volatilities in local 
currencies are not very different from volatilities in USD because exchange rate volatilities are much smaller than 
the volatilities of firm performance and characteristics.  This is even true in developing countries.  We also find a 
positive correlation between firm growth and appreciation of local currency. 
 
Alternative Measure of Profitability  
Percentage growth (log difference) in profits is not defined when earnings are less than zero.  So, observations with 
negative earnings are automatically omitted from the calculation of profit growth volatilities.  To solve this problem, 
we use an alternative measure of variation in profitability: we compute the volatilities of ROAs (level) instead of 
profits growth.   The results are qualitatively similar.        
 
Controls for Size and Age 
We also use market capitalization as an alternative proxy for firm size.  Market capitalization is computed from 
number of shares outstanding x year-end equity price in USD.  The size quintile constructed from market 
capitalization is highly correlated with our original measure constructed from total assets.  All existing results still 
hold. 
 
One might be concerned that size quintile constructed from a global distribution might not be an adequate control 
for firm size and that total assets might not be comparable across countries.  For example, a certain level of total 
assets that are considered small in large countries should be considered large in small countries because it is larger 
than other firms in its own country.  To address these issues, we replace the size quintile with the exact firm size 
(natural log of total assets), the size relative to other firms in its country (the firm’s total assets scaled by its 
country’s average total assets), and the size relative to other firms in its local sector (the firm’s total assets scaled by 
its local sector’s average total assets) where a local sector is defined as one of the 17 Fama-French industries in the 
firm’s country.   Our main results hold for all alternative measures – firms in developed countries and smaller firms 
have higher volatilities.  
 
To address the concern that observations in developed and developing countries are not comparable because firms in 
different countries decide to go public at different stages in their life cycles, we control for firm age (averaged across 
all years the firm is present in the sample).  Our existing results still hold.  Firms in developed countries also have 
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higher volatilities.  Older firms also have lower volatilities.  However, the interpretation of this result is not clear as 
survival of older firms can be considered a measure of market imperfection itself. 
 
Standard Errors 
First, we compute heteroscedasticity robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimators.  In addition 
to robust standard errors, we estimate the standard errors with clusters on country and industry where each industry 
is defined as a two-digit SIC group.  All the main results are still statistically significant. 
 
5.2 Cross-Sectional Dispersion  
We estimate several variations of the cross-sectional dispersion regressions in Table 5.  First, we replace year-fixed 
effects with GDP growth rates and find that dispersions tend to be higher during bad times (year with lower GDP 
growth rate).  We also compute cross-sectional dispersion within a sector instead of within a country.  Sector is 
defined as one of the 17 Fama-Frech Industries within a country.  We find that sector-level dispersions of sales 
growth, asset growth, total debt growth, short-term liability growth, and employment growth across firms within an 
industry are higher in developed countries.  The sectors with more high-tech firms have higher cross-sectional 
dispersions.  The sectors with more manufacturing firms have lower cross-sectional dispersions.   
 
5.4 Competition and Firm-Level Risk 
Alternative Measures of Competition 
In addition to foreign entry, we also use two other proxies for international competition.  We examine the volatilities 
of cross-listed and export-oriented firms.  It is likely that cross-listed and export-oriented firms have more exposure 
to global competition.  We collect the data on ADRs from Bank of New York Mellon and foreign sales from 
WorldScope.  Then, we include ADR dummy and percentage of foreign sales in the regressions.  First, we find 
positive correlations with size quintile – larger firms are more likely to have ADRs and a higher fraction of foreign 
sales.  After controlling for size quintile, firms with ADRs and firms with a higher percentage of foreign sales are 
indeed more volatile.  
We also use privatization of state-owned enterprises as an alternative proxy of increases in competitive pressure.  An 
extensive literature finds that state-owned enterprises experience increases in profitability, productivity, and 
investment after privatization.  (See, for example, Gupta (2005).)  We thus expect that privatization of state-owned 
enterprises affects risk of other incumbent firms.  The data on privatization are from the World Bank’s Privatization 
Database.  We include privatization dummy in the regressions.  The dummy takes the value of one if the firm is in 
an industry where privatization of state-owned enterprises took place during 1989-1998 and zero otherwise.  We 
find that firms in industry with privatization experience higher volatilities in the subsequent period. 
 
6. Drivers of Firm-Level Volatilities 
Inclusion of Interaction between Developed Country Dummy and Firm Size 
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In Table 8 Panels A-C, we also estimate the specification where the interaction between Developed Country Dummy 
and Size Quintile is included.  The coefficient on this interaction term is negative and significant.  Besides Size 
Quintile constructed from global distribution of firms, we also use two alternative proxies: (1) Size Quintile from the 
distribution within one country and (2) Firm Age.  The coefficients on the interaction terms are all negative.  These 
findings are consistent with the notion that small and young firms in developed countries are particularly risky 
because they have to compete with both new entrants and larger incumbents.  The interactions between Developed 
Country Dummy and industry indicators (High-Tech Dummy, External Finance, and Small Firm Dominated) remain 
significant across all specifications, implying that the size and the industry effects are distinct and non-nested.   
 
Inclusion of Interactions between Industry Indicators and Firm Size 
In Table 8 Panels A-C, we also estimate the specification with the interactions between High-Tech Dummy and Size 
Quintile, between External Finance and Size Quintile, and between Small Firm Dominated and Size Quintile.  We 
find that the size effects are more pronounced in high-tech, external finance dependent, and large-firm dominated 
industries.  The interactions between Developed Country Dummy and High-Tech Dummy, between Developed 
Country Dummy and External Finance, and between Developed Country Dummy and Small Firm Dominated 
remain significant, implying that the size and the country effects are distinct and non-nested. 
 
Alternative Specifications 
In Table 8 Panels A-C, we replace developed country dummies with a full set of country fixed-effects, replace 
industry characteristics with a full set of two-digit SIC industry fixed-effects, and estimate the coefficients on the 
interaction between 1980 Per Capita GDP and industry characteristics (High-Tech Dummy, External Finance 
Dependency, and Small Firm Industry Indicators).  The results are qualitatively similar. Most coefficients on the 
interaction terms and size quintile remain statistically significant at 1%. 
 
7. Reaction to Shocks  
Alternative Specifications 
We estimate several variations of the reaction-to-shock regressions in Table 9.  We use growth in output and labor 
productivity (output per worker) as alternative proxies for productivity shock. We use per capita GDP in 1980 
instead of the developed country dummy for the interaction terms.  To address the concern that financial statement 
data are not reliable in some countries, we replace WorldScope financial statement data with establishments, 
employment, fixed capital, and sales data from UNIDO.  We also divide the sample based on the country dummy 
and firm size quintile.  We find the firms in developed countries are more sensitive to shocks in all these robustness 
tests. 
 
Matching Shock Size 
In Table 9, the firm fixed-effects already control for the difference in average growth rates and average productivity 
shock.  However, shock size (absolute value of the shock) can still differ across countries.  So, we examine the size 
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distribution of shocks.  We indeed find that the average shock size is larger in developing countries: we classify 
observations into shock size quartiles and the majority of observations from developing countries fall in the largest 
quartile.  As a consequence, one might be concerned that firm reactions in developed and developing countries are 
not comparable because the productivity shocks are of different sizes.  To address this concern, (1) given that most 
observations with small productivity shocks are from developed countries, we re-run the response-to-shock 
regressions using only the subsample with shocks from the largest quartile.  (In this quartile, we have roughly equal 
number of firms in developed and developing countries.)  (2) Alternatively, we directly assign each observation in 
developing countries a developed country match based on productivity quartile, sector, year, and firm size.  We still 
find that firms in developed countries are more responsive to shocks.  Across all types of assets and liabilities, cash 
is the most responsive component. 
 
8. Additional Tests 
8.2 Alternative Measures for Country Characteristics 
In Table 11 Panel A, we also control for other firm characteristics from the cash holding literature: lagged Leverage, 
Dividend Dummy, Capital Expenditure/Total Assets, Acquisitions/Total Assets, R&D/Total Assets, and Tobin’s Q.  
All institutional variables remain significant at the 1% level. 
 
As an alternative to McLean, Zhang, and Zhao’s (2012) measures, we also use the elasticity of industry investment 
to industry value added from Wurgler (2000) as a proxy for allocative efficiency.  The results are qualitatively 
similar. 
 
8.3 Effects of Volatilities on Cash Holding 
Alternative Specifications 
It is possible that the results in Table 12 Panel B are driven by omitted variables.   Sector average of firm-
level volatilities may pick up industry effects not captured by manufacturing and high-tech dummies or pick up 
country effects not captured by developed country dummy.  To address these concerns, we replace developed-
country dummies with 1980 per capita GDP and replace manufacturing/ high-tech dummies with a full set of two-
digit SIC fixed effects.  The coefficient on firm-level volatility is still large and statistically significant at 1% level. 
Dittmar and Duchin (2012)’s Specification 
Following Dittmar and Duchin (2012), we also estimate an alternative specification where we do not scale cash with 
total assets and use either (1) cash in dollar amount or (2) a dummy variable indicating whether firm cash holding is 
in the top decile as our dependent variable.  We still find that firms in developed countries and firms in high-tech 
industries hold more cash.  The coefficients on developed countries and high-tech dummies are large and highly 
significant.  As expected, larger firms hold more cash in dollar amounts and are more likely to be in the top cash 
decile.     
 
Controls for Alternatives to Cash Holdings 
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A concern is that cash holding may differ across countries because firms in certain countries have better access to 
alternative sources of liquidity.  For example, closely-held firms such as family businesses might be able to raise 
capital from their block holders.  Conglomerates may be able to transfer funds across their industrial segments.  
Firms with bank relationships may be able to use lines of credit in lieu of cash.  As a robustness check, we control 
for factors that determine a firm’s alternatives to cash: ownership, organizational structure, and bank relationship.  
All data are from WorldScope.   
 
First, we control for the fraction of shares that are closely-held.  We find that shares are more closely-held in 
developing countries and in small firms.  The correlation between the fraction of closely-held shares and developed 
country dummy is -18% and the correlation between the fraction of closely-held shares and size quintile is -14%.  
We find that closely-held firms hold less cash but the coefficients become less significant after controlling for the 
developed country dummy.  Closely-held firms are also less volatile. 
 
We also directly address the concern that our results are driven by family business groups in emerging markets.   We 
use the ownership data from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) which cover the sample of firms in East Asia 
where family businesses are prevalent.  First, we include a family business group dummy in the regressions from 
Tables 3 and 4 to examine the effects of family business group membership on cash holding and volatilities among 
firms whose ownership data are available.  We confirm that family firms hold less cash and have lower volatilities.  
To ensure that our results are not solely driven by family firms, we also run the regressions in Tables 3 and 4 with 
the subsample of non-family firms in East Asia, using firms in the U.S. as a benchmark.  We still find that 
developed-country firms still hold more cash and higher volatilities.  We further exclude American firms with dual-
class shares (which are more likely to be family firms) from the sample and focus on non-family firms in East Asia 
and non-dual class firms in the U.S.  Again, firms in developed countries (primarily the U.S.) still hold more cash 
and have higher volatilities. 
 
Second, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether a firm reports more than one product segment.  We find 
that 37% of firms in developed countries and 19% of firms in developing countries are multi-segment.   Multi-
segment firms are also larger than single-segment firms.   Firms in high-tech industries are less likely to have more 
than one segment while firms in manufacturing industries are more likely to have more than one segment.   Multi-
segment firms tend to hold less cash and have lower volatilities than average firms.    
 
Third, we control for bank relationships.  Since WorldScope does not provide any direct data on bank loans, we use 
a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has any loans as a proxy for bank relationship.  We find that firms with 
positive total loans tend to hold less cash.  
 
Overall, our evidence supports the notion that firms with better access to alternative sources of liquidity hold less 
cash.  However, our main results are confounded with these factors - the coefficients on volatilities, developed 
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country dummies, and other variables remain highly significant after controlling for ownership, organizational 
structure, and bank relationship.      
 
Standard Errors 
We estimate the robust standard errors and the standard errors with clusters on country and industry where each 
industry is defined as a two-digit SIC group.  We also perform generalized least square and compute bootstrapping 
standard errors.  All the main results are still statistically significant. 
 
Internet Appendix B: A Stylized Model of Real Volatilities 
With a stylized model of real volatilities, we illustrate how market imperfections in developing countries can 
simultaneously lead to lower risk at the firm level and higher risk at the aggregate level.  For simplicity, we assume 
that there are two firms, A and B.  Each firm is endowed with fixed supply of productive resources XA and XB.  The 
economy lasts T periods and the resources do not depreciate.  Firms have a linear production function: F(ei,t ,Ki,t) = 
ei,t Ki,t where Ki,t is the amount of productive resources allocated to firm i at time t, i={A,B}, and t={0,…,T}.   The 
distribution of productivity ei is identical and independent across time.  We assume that the shocks are binomial: eA 
=H and eB =L with probability ½ and eA =L and eB =H with probability ½.  Also, H-L = d and d >0.  The parameter 
d represents the true difference in firm-level productivities which does not vary across countries.  From this set-up, 
the first best allocation of resources is KA,t = XA + XB and  KB,t =0 if eA,t > eB,t  and KA,t =0 and  KB,t = XA + XB if eA,t 
< eB,t.     
The key assumption here is that goods and capital markets might be less than fully efficient.  Specifically, we 
assume that it is costly to reallocate resources across firms.  For firm B to transfer δ units of resources to firm A for 
one period, the transaction cost C(δ) must be incurred.  Examples of adjustment cost C(.) include external financing 
cost of the expanding firms or the cost associated with asymmetric information in the market for productive assets.  
These costs are expected to be high in developing countries.  
With costly adjustment, the allocation of resources must solve the Bellman’s equation below:   
V(eA,t , eB,t) = max δ t  eA,t KA,t + eB,t KB,t  - C (δ t) + E[V(eA,t+1 , eB,t+1)]  where KA,t = XA+ δ t, KB,t = XB- δ t, and V(eA,T , 
eB,T ) =0.  Following Hayashi (1982), we use quadratic transaction cost:  C(δ t)=  c/2 (δ t)
 2
.  The transaction cost 
parameter c directly captures the degree of market imperfections.  For simplicity, we further assume that transaction 
cost is large enough, c > d/min(XA,XB) , so neither firms will be allocated all the resources in the economy XA + XB 
(i.e., corner solutions).   
Lemma 1: The policy function is δ t = (eA,t - eB,t)/c.  This policy implies that:   
                                        
Capital of Firm A =        Capital of Firm A =        
x 
 
Output of Firm A =           Output of Firm A =           
Capital of Firm B =        Capital of Firm B =        
Output of Firm B =         ) Output of Firm B =         ) 
Aggregate Output =                     Aggregate Output =                    
Proof: 
After substituting the resource constraints into the objective function, the maximization problem becomes  
max δ t  eA,t (XA+ δ t) + eB,t (XB- δ t) - C (δ t) + E[V(eA,t+1 , eB,t+1)].  
First Order Condition with respect to    is            C'(  ) + E[V' (.) ] =            c δt = 0    
The policy function is                        
In other words,    {
                       
                        
 where       . 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1: Output growth of firms in developed countries is more volatile.  Firm-level volatility is decreasing in 
the market imperfection parameter, c.   
Proof: 
Without loss of generality, we focus on the output of firm A (denoted by   ).  Let         
    is the output of firm A when                    .  So,            . 
    is the output of firm A when                    .  So,            . 
Output growth of firm A in percentage term is                         .  Given the binomial nature of the 
productivity process, output growth of firm A must take one of these three values:    {           } where 
    
       
   
 
   
   
   and       
       
   
 
   
   
  . 
Next, we show that positive output growth (   ) is decreasing in c and negative output growth (     ) is increasing 
in c.  In other words, a large value of c will move the growth rate closer to zero.  
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Using the chain rule, 
      
  
 
 
  
(
 
 
)
      
  
   (
 
  
)
      
  
  . 
Our economy lasts T periods.  Let   be the volatility of a sample path:                  .  Volatility is defined as 
the time series standard deviation of the growth rates along the sample path.  
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Now, we show that    is decreasing in c by taking the first partial derivative with respect to c. 
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According to the definition of  ̅, the last term in the expression above is equal to  zero. 
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Since     {           }, the average growth rate is bounded by     and       (          ̅     ). 
If       , then       ̅ 
   
  
   because        ̅        
    
  
  . 
If         , then       ̅ 
   
  
    because          ̅        
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If     , then       ̅ 
   
  
    because  
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So,       ̅ 
   
  
 is always (weakly) negative. 
We can conclude that 
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  :    is decreasing in c.  Given that volatility V cannot be 
negative, 
  
  
  :   is decreasing in c as well.  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2: Output growth of firms in developed countries is more sensitive to productivity shocks.  Output-to-
shock sensitivity is decreasing in the market imperfection parameter, c. 
Proof: 
Without loss of generality, we focus on the output of firm A.         is defined as a percentage change in firm A’s 
productivity:                             .  Given the binomial nature of the productivity process, productivity 
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shock of firm A must take one of these three values:        {                    } where         
   
 
 
 
 
 
and           
   
 
 
  
 
. 
To measure output-to-shock sensitivity, we estimate the coefficients of the following regression using the data from 
a sample path:                                   and the corresponding                   .    
                  
The estimate of   is given by the following equation: 
   
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅       ̅ 
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Now, we show that    is decreasing in c by taking the first partial derivative with respect to c. 
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According to the definition of      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , the last term in the expression above is equal to  zero. 
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There are only three possible realizations of productivity shock and output growth: 
            {                                     }.  The average productivity shock is bounded by 
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We can conclude that 
   
  
 
 
 (            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ )
  
   
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    
   
  
       :    is decreasing in c.  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3: Aggregate output growth is less volatile in developed countries.  Aggregate volatility is increasing in 
the market imperfection parameter, c. 
Let O be aggregate output if there is no reallocation in the economy.  
When                            .  When                           . 
Without loss of generality, assume that initial endowment of firm A is greater than the initial endowment of firm B 
(       so that, without resource reallocation, aggregate output is higher when firm A receives higher 
productivity than firm B        . 
Define   
 
 
 and      . 
Let  ̃ be aggregate output if there is reallocation of resources in the economy.  
When                ̃    ̃       .  When                ̃    ̃        . 
Aggregate output growth in percentage term is      ̃    ̃      ̃   .  Given the binomial nature of the 
productivity process, aggregate output growth must take one of these three values:    {           } where 
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. 
Next, we show that positive output growth (   ) is increasing in c and negative output growth (     ) is decreasing 
in c.  In other words, a small value of c will move the growth rate closer to zero.  
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Let   be the volatility of a sample growth path                  . Volatility is defined as the time series standard 
deviation of the growth rates along the sample path. 
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Now, we show that    is increasing in c by taking the first partial derivative with respect to c. 
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According to the definition of  ̅, the last term in the expression above is equal to  zero. 
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Since    {           }, the average growth rate is bounded by     and       (          ̅     ). 
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We can conclude that  
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  :    is increasing in c.  Given that volatility V cannot be 
negative, 
  
  
  :   is increasing in c as well.  
Q.E.D. 
 
Internet Appendix C: The Country Coverage of WorldScope 
Full-Coverage 
Developed countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  
Emerging markets include Brazil, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, and 
Thailand. 
Targeted Coverage 
Countries include Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Israel, Lithuania, New 
Zealand, Peru, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
 
